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Seven Answers for Professor Anastaplo
Harry V. Jaffa*
I.
The first of Professor Anastaplo's seven questions is:
"What more should be said on behalf of Attorney General
Meese with respect to the matters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa?"
In addressing this question, I am reminded irresistibly of a
scene in Duck Soup. The revolution in Fredonia is at its cli-
max, and the four Marx brothers are manning the guns.
Shells fly overhead and crash behind them. Mrs. Teasdale
enters stage right and asks: "What's going on here?" Groucho
replies: "We're defending your honor, which is more than you
ever did."
Similarly, Professor Anastaplo is attempting more on
behalf of the former Attorney General than either Mr. Meese,
or anyone in the Justice Department, or any of the conserva-
tive think tanks has ever done. The short answer-indeed the
sufficient answer- to Professor Anastaplo's question is "noth-
ing." It is Professor Anastaplo, not Mr. Meese, who couldn't
care less, and who takes issue with my assertion that no one,
on or off the Supreme Court, has ever expounded the theory of
original intent with greater eloquence or conviction than Chief
Justice Taney did in the case of Dred Scott.
Professor Anastaplo finds it difficult to credit either with
eloquence or conviction "an argument that is patently false."
But surely, an argument need not be true to be eloquently
expressed. Consider Antony's speech, of unsurpassed elo-
quence and equally unsurpassed hypocrisy, over the dead body
of Caesar, in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. Antony was utterly
cynical about the truth of his speech. But I am aware of no
reason to think that Chief Justice Taney was saying something
he did not believe to be true.
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Professor Anastaplo and I both find the critical defect in
Chief Justice Taney's opinion to be his assertion that
"[N]egroes of the African race" were, at the time of Revolu-
tion, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
believed to be "so far inferior that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect." For this reason, Chief
Justice Taney maintained, they could not have been included
in the humanity referred to in the Declaration's proposition
"that all men are created equal." Professor Anastaplo points to
Blackstone for evidence of the opinion of most Americans in
1776 as to the humanity of blacks and their natural rights. He
could have supplemented this evidence with countless contem-
porary quotations of Americans at the time of the Revolution
to prove the truth of this contention. None of this, however,
has any bearing on whether Taney was sincere in his mistaken
belief.
Chief Justice Taney himself conceded that the words of
the Declaration seem to have included black men no less than
white. But, he said, the state of public opinion at the time was
such that these words could not have meant what they said. It
was inconsistent with the character of the men who signed the
Declaration, Taney said, to have included Negroes in the prop-
osition that all men are created equal, and then to have failed
to abolish slavery. Taney certainly seems to have assumed,
apparently unconsciously, and certainly without any argument,
that the ground of morality is something like Kant's categori-
cal imperative.
"Original intent" as Taney understood it would be an
inference, not so much from what the documents of the Revo-
lutionary period said, as from the maxims upon which the
statesmen of the period were supposed to have acted. It is
proper to point out that this assumption of Taney's is not
intrinsically unreasonable, and provides an internally consis-
tent interpretation of the Founding. It is mistaken nonetheless
in that it does not understand the Founding Fathers as they
understood themselves. More importantly, it does not recog-
nize that prudence and a prudential morality, unlike the cate-
gorical imperative, was the ground of their statesmanship as
they understood it. There was, in fact, nothing inconsistent
with recognizing the wrongfulness of slavery while at the same
time understanding that such recognition was only the first
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step in a long process leading to the "ultimate extinction" of
slavery.
Professor Anastaplo also finds it difficult to credit Taney
with sincerity. But why? Taney's opinion about the Founding
is almost universal among the "intellectuals" of the academy,
his colleagues and mine, today. I recall an evening at St. Johns
College, Annapolis, not many years ago. I had given a lecture
on "How to Think About the American Revolution." After the
lecture, the discussion began, and it lasted until one o'clock in
the morning. We spoke of only one topic for the entire four
hours: "Why did the Founding Fathers not abolish slavery, if
they were sincere in asserting that all men are created equal?"
As I recall, I made virtually no headway in persuading the
members of the St. Johns College community that the failure
of the Founding Fathers to abolish slavery did not detract from
the sincerity of their conviction that slavery was morally
wrong. I pointed out what Lincoln had shown, in his speech on
Dred Scott, that it never was in the power of the statesmen of
the Revolution to abolish slavery, no matter how much they
may have wished to do so. I pointed out that it was not at all
wonderful that a nation of slaveholders, all thirteen states as
of 1776, had not abolished slavery.
What was wonderful, however, was that a nation of slave-
holders had declared that all men are created equal, and
thereby had made the ultimate abolition of slavery a moral
necessity. Finally, I pointed out that the fourscore and seven
years required to accomplish this abolition was a very short
period in human history, particularly since slavery was per-
haps the oldest institution of human civilization next to the
family.
Although the St. John's students and faculty who partici-
pated in the discussion were, for the most part, experienced
exegetes of the Nicomachean Ethics, they seemed uninterested
in applying Aristotle's conception of prudential wisdom to the
historical and moral reality of the American Founding.
Despite the reference to the dictates of prudence contained in
the Declaration of Independence itself, they took it for
granted, as did Chief Justice Taney, that the morality of the
Founding Fathers could only be vindicated on Kantian
grounds. Although few of them knew who Chief Justice Taney
was, their view of the Founding was dogmatically Taneyite.
The near universality of Taney's opinion today is seen in
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its equal, appeal to both the radical Left and the radical Right.
Judge Leon Higgenbotham, a distinguished scholar and federal
appeals court judge, who nominally belongs to the Black
Power wing of contemporary American historiography has
written that, had the authors of the Declaration stated that
"all white men" or "all white men who own property" are cre-
ated equal, they would more accurately conveyed their mean-
ing. Although I do not think that Judge Higginbotham is a
Marxist, this also happens to be the Marxist interpretation of
the Founding. Ironically, the old line state's rights conserva-
tives, whose views predominated in the Meese Justice Depart-
ment, are in fundamental agreement with Judge Higginbotham
and the Marxists. State's rights Conservatives tend to fluctu-
ate between the Calhounites, who think that the Declaration
did include Negroes and therefore was irrelevant, and the
Taneyites who think the Declaration was relevant, but only
because it did not include Negroes. For the latter, the equality
of the Declaration is a collective equality, as it is in the proleta-
riat of Karl Marx.
Consider the following: "Whereas the original Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights [as originally understood] have
enjoyed the universal acclaim of thoughtful conservatives, a
number of amendments, particularly the 14th, have proved to
be anathema . .. "'
That the Constitution with slavery has enjoyed "the uni-
versal acclaim of thoughtful conservatives" implies the accept-
ance of either Chief Justice Taney's or Calhoun's
constitutionalism. This view is reinforced by McClellan's vig-
orous assertion that the amendments abolishing slavery and
attempting to guarantee the equal protection of the laws to all
persons are "anathema." Left and Right, each for its own rea-
sons, agrees with Chief Justice Taney's or Calhoun's opinion.
Professor Anastaplo writes that: "Mr. Meese is correct in
sensing that Chief Justice Taney did not believe in 'original
intent,' else he would have approached the slavery question
quite differently .... One can see in Chief Justice Taney, as in
Calhoun, how reason can be subverted by passion." I do not
see how Mr. Meese could have sensed anything about Taney's
1. The Constitution from a Conservative Perspective, A Lecture at the Heritage
Foundation by James McClellan, President of the Center for Judicial Studies (known
to the cognoscenti as the Headquarters of the Army of Northern Virginia) (Mar. 10,
1988).
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belief in "original intent," because, as far as I know, he did not
know that it existed. Following Chief Justice Rehnquist, Mr.
Meese found the evil of Dred Scott only in the Court's alleged
usurpation of the powers of Congress. Neither Mr. Meese nor
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the dehumanization of the
Negro to be an objectionable feature of Taney's opinion. Rehn-
quist, we know, could not have found so in any case, because
he does not believe in anything that might be called an "idea of
natural justice," such as is implied in the concept of dehumani-
zation. For Rehnquist, an uncompromising legal positivist, the
Declaration of Independence has no more status in constitu-
tional interpretation than it had for Calhoun. It is all very
well for Professor Anastaplo to say that one can see how, in
the Taney and Calhoun opinions, reason can be subverted by
passion. But he must recognize that reason has been subverted
in exactly the same way in the great majority of our contempo-
raries, including the luminaries of present-day jurisprudence.
Professor Anastaplo writes that one should not "accept as
readily as Mr. Jaffa seems to do the Taney proposition that the
Constitution is friendly to slavery. Rather, the Constitution of
1787 can be read as reflecting a grudging accommodation to
slavery .... " The operative expression in the foregoing is "can
be read." Indeed, the Constitution can be read as reflecting the
aforesaid accommodation. That is how I read it. Professor
Anastaplo and some few of our contemporaries also read it
that way. But it can be so read only if one makes the princi-
ples of the Declaration the touchstone of the Constitution, as
those principles were interpreted by Abraham Lincoln. With-
out this touchstone, the Constitution "can be read"-indeed it
can hardly be read otherwise-than as a pro-slavery document.
On one occasion, Attorney General Meese did read the Consti-
tution in the Lincolnian way and I congratulated him for hav-
ing done so. This occurred during a speech at Dickinson
College on September 17, 1985. But his record from that day
forward is one of apparently complete amnesia of what he said
on that occasion. Let me here record my conviction that the
Dickinson speech, perhaps accidentally, was written under the
influence of the Lincolnian understanding. But the reaction of
the Confederate constitutionalists in the Department of Justice
was so sharp and strong that the experiment was never
repeated. I am confident that Mr. Meese himself was blissfully
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unaware of this re-enactment of the Civil War resulting in a
Confederate triumph within his own public persona.
Professor Anastaplo writes:
Two other dubious features of the Taney opinion in Dred
Scott, which Mr. Jaffa seems to acquiesce in should be
noticed. One is that Congress could not act to restrict slavery
in the Territories if slaves were regarded as merely property.
But due process should not be taken to mean that particular
kinds of property cannot be singled out for special legislative
treatment (and even complete suppression) in various cir-
cumstances. It is hardly likely that the State legislatures
that abolished property in slaves from 1776 on violated the
due process clauses in their constitutions.2
Before the Civil War, there was no question that states had a
sovereign right either to include or to exclude slavery from
among their domestic institutions. There is no proper analogy,
therefore, between the bearing of "due process" upon the right
of States, on the one hand, and of Congress or a Territorial leg-
islature on the other hand, to abolish property in slaves. Chief
Justice Taney's opinion, moreover, did not regard slaves
merely as property. In erroneously asserting that the right to
property in slaves was "expressly affirmed" in the Constitu-
tion, Chief Justice Taney held, with perfect consistency, that
slave property was indeed "singled out" for protection by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The second "dubious feature" of Chief Justice Taney's
opinion, in which Professor Anastaplo asserts I acquiesce, is
"the assumption that what the Court said in defining the pow-
ers of Congress with respect to the Territories was binding
upon the Congress." Professor Anastaplo "doubts the propri-
ety of judicial review" in such matters, and thinks that Lin-
coln, although perhaps exercising a prudent reserve, doubted it
too. Happily, this is one of the most discussed issues in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates, and if Lincoln exercised any reserve
about it, I have not been able to detect it.
The person who doubted the effective power of the Court
to bind the Congress was not Lincoln, but rather was Douglas.
It was Douglas who repeated, over and over again, that the
power of the Court either to authorize or to forbid slavery in
the Territories was merely "abstract." According to Douglas,
2. Anastaplo, Seven Questions for Professor Jaffa, 10 UNIV. OF PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 507, 515 (1987).
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the practical or effective power, either to protect slavery or to
exclude slavery, rested neither with the Court nor with the
Congress, but with the people of the Territories. Only they
could pass the local police regulations upon which the actual
existence of slavery depended. If they denied slave owners that
protection, slavery would by that fact be excluded. If they pro-
vided such protection, then slave property could be held safely
and enjoyed. That was what Douglas meant by popular
sovereignty.
Lincoln ridiculed this doctrine insofar as it asserts that a
thing, slavery, could lawfully be driven from a place, the Terri-
tories, where the Supreme Court said it had a lawful right to
be. As we have seen, Chief Justice Taney had held, and Doug-
las would not dispute, that the right to hold slaves in any
United States Territory was a right "expressly affirmed" in the
Constitution. To say that such a right might be barren and
worthless because of the failure of either a Territorial legisla-
ture or of the United States Congress to enact the laws neces-
sary to make it valuable, was entirely inadmissible according to
Lincoln. "Why, there is not such an abolitionist in the nation
as Douglas after all," were Lincoln's last words in the joint
debates. Lincoln's statement leading to that conclusion was as
follows:
I suppose that most of us... believe that the people of the
Southern States are entitled to a Congressional fugitive slave
law, that it is a right fixed in the Constitution. But it cannot
be made available to them without Congressional legislation.
In the Judge's language, it is a "barren right" which needs
legislation before it can become efficient and valuable to the
person to whom it is guaranteed. And as the right is consti-
tutional I agree that the legislation shall be granted to it,
and that not that we like the institution of slavery ... why
then do I yield support to a fugitive slave law? Because I do
not understand that the Constitution, which guarantees that
right, can be supported without it. And if I believed that the
right to hold a slave in a Territory was equally fixed in the
Constitution with the right to reclaim fugitives, I should be
bound to give it the legislation necessary to support it. I say
that no man can deny his obligation to give the necessary
legislation to support slavery in a Territory, who believes it
is a constitutional right to have it there. No man can, who
does not give the Abolitionist an argument to deny an obliga-
tion enjoined by the Constitution to enact a fugitive slave
law .... I say if that Dred Scott decision is correct then the
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right to hold slaves in a Territory is equally a constitutional
right with the right of a slaveholder to have his runaway
returned .... I defy any man to make an argument that will
justify unfriendly legislation to deprive a slaveholder of his
right to hold his slave in a Territory, that will not equally, in
all its length, breadth, and thickness furnish an argument
for nullifying the fugitive slave law.
Lincoln's words, it must be noted, gave a great impetus to
the movement of events towards secession and civil war. The
deep South believed sincerely that Chief Justice Taney's opin-
ion in Dred Scott was correct, and that the only power granted
by the Constitution to Congress over slave property in the Ter-
ritories was "the power coupled with the duty of guarding and
protecting the owner in his rights." The phrase "coupled with
the duty" embodied precisely what Lincoln said at the end of
his debates with Douglas. From Lincoln's perspective, if Taney
was right, then the deep South was justified when, at the Dem-
ocratic National Convention in Charleston in May 1860 it
insisted that a federal slave code for the Territories be
included in the platform. It was the refusal of the Douglas
Democrats to accede to this demand that led to the secession of
the deep South from the national party. This was the begin-
ning, and alone would have been a sufficient cause of the seces-
sion of the states from the Union after Lincoln's election. In
this respect, the question for Lincoln was not whether the
Court could bind Congress, but whether the Court understood
the Constitution correctly. If Chief Justice Taney was correct
in holding as he did in Dred Scott that it was the constitutional
power and duty of Congress to protect slavery in the Territo-
ries, then there was no question in Lincoln's mind that that
opinion would have been binding on Congress. The Lincoln-
Douglas debates leave no room for doubt on this point.
In concluding this point, I would refer readers to what is
said in "Who Killed Cock Robin?"3 concerning a hypothetical
"reverse" Dred Scott decision. There is no question but that
Abraham Lincoln would have considered binding on Congress
a Supreme Court decision holding that the constitutional
power of Congress in the Territories was the power, coupled
with the duty, of assuring the exclusion of slavery. At the time
of the Wilmot Proviso, Lincoln observed that, according to the
3. To be published in the spring 1990 issue of the University of Puget Sound Law
Review.
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laws of nature, freedom followed the flag, and that any and all
territory acquired by the United States was a priori free terri-
tory. Only positive law could make slavery lawful. Therefore,
in the absence of positive law, the natural condition of any
United States Territory was one of freedom. Congressional
legislation was necessary, he thought, to make this exclusion
unambiguous and effective. Lincoln's position resembled that
of Madison on the Bill of Rights. In 1787, Madison maintained
that a bill of rights would be superfluous because the United
States had no constitutional power to do those things that the
Bill of Rights would forbid it to do. Nevertheless, he led the
way in the first Congress in drafting and adopting the first ten
amendments. He did so, not because he thought his previous
views were mistaken, but rather, because he had come to
believe that what was merely implicit had to become explicit if
the public mind was to rest secure in its belief in these limita-
tions upon federal power.
II.
In Professor Anastaplo's second question, he asks: "[d]oes
Mr. Jaffa recognize sufficiently the shortcomings of the equal-
ity which he so eloquently extols?"
Among those alleged shortcomings are "an emphasis upon
self-centeredness and upon private right, [which] . . . can pro-
mote relativism, if not even nihilism, and hence another kind
of tyranny. In any event, is it not 'freedom,' even more than
"equality" which appeals to mankind's noblest opposition to
slavery?" Abraham Lincoln would have been puzzled, if not
astounded, at the thought that the equality he so eloquently
extolled could be set in opposition to the freedom, or liberty,
he extolled with equal eloquence. After all, his opposition to
slavery as a denial of liberty was grounded in the principle of
equality.
In the language of the Revolution, freedom and equality
had been largely synonymous. If they differed at all, it was as
complementary, rather than as opposing or contrary terms.
Consider Virginia's Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776,
"[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent"
and that of Massachusetts in 1780, that "[a]ll men are born free
and equal." It is in Tocqueville's Democracy in America that
equality and liberty are set against each other. But Tocqueville
ignored the Declaration of Independence, and the theory it
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embodied, in his analysis. For Tocqueville, equality meant, in
essence, an equality of condition. The liberty to which he
opposed it was the liberty of men to cultivate their talents and
pursue their ambitions in such a way as to produce inequality
of condition. He saw egalitarianism, as does Professor Anas-
taplo, as a leveling force, using the power of the majority to
discourage, or even punish, those who excel by their talents
and achievements.
Certainly, in our time, we have seen the spurious appeal to
equality as a force for redistributing wealth, not as a charitable
aid to the deserving poor, but to punish enterprise and indus-
try. Its most powerful motive is envy. Perhaps the most lucid
expression of this kind of egalitarianism is Marx's classic
formula for distributive justice in a Communist society: "From
each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."
This divorce of the idea of work from the idea of reward for
work is not merely utopian; it is, at its root, against nature and
hence against the idea of natural rights and natural justice
embodied in the Declaration of Independence. By abandoning
the connection between justice and nature, it does indeed lead
both to the nihilism and the tyranny that Professor Anastaplo
so justly fears.
In a celebrated passage of the tenth Federalist, Madison
speaks of "the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property" as "the first object of government." It
would be perfectly correct to amend this passage to say that it
is the equal protection of unequal faculties which is intended.
As such, the passage is in perfect harmony with the principle
of equality, rightly understood. We must remember that this is
said in the context of the Madisonian solution for the problem
of faction, above all of the problem of majority faction. The
entire tenth Federalist is devoted to showing how a Republican
regime can be made to serve the principles of natural justice
over against a naked majoritarianism based upon a false notion
of equality.
The passage in the Federalist concerning the protection of
"different and unequal faculties" is usually interpreted to
mean that the rights of property shall be protected from appro-
priation or expropriation by a merely numerical majority. This
interpretation is correct yet insufficient. A fuller interpreta-
tion provides that the poor or weak shall not be unjustly
deprived of their equal right to their own property. In facing
[Vol. 13:379
Seven Answers for Professor Anastaplo
the terrible prejudice against Negroes, Lincoln conceded that
in some respects they were not his equals. The only respect in
which he ever actually made this concession was color. How-
ever, to say that black is not equal to white, means no more
than that black is not white. Of the black woman, Lincoln
once declared: "In some respects she certainly is not my equal;
but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her
own hands without the leave of anyone else, she is my equal,
and the equal of all others." Of course, a natural right to eat
the bread one earns implies a natural liberty to earn that bread
and to earn it in a free market. Furthermore, a free market is
one to which all breadwinners have equal access.. No one may
arbitrarily be excluded from the free competition of the mar-
ket place or compelled to labor at an occupation inferior to one
which freedom of contract might entitle him or her. Freedom
of contract, one should remember, is a necessary implication of
the natural right of ownership of one's own person, with
respect to which all men are created equal.
Concerning the envy of the rich by the poor, animated by
a false idea of equality, leading in turn to class warfare, Lin-
coln wrote as follows:
Nor should this [the rights of labor] lead to a war upon prop-
erty. Property is the fruit of labor, property is desirable, is a
positive good in the world. That some should be rich, shows
that others may become rich, and hence is just encourage-
ment to industry and enterprise. Let not him who is house-
less pull down the house of another; but let him labor
diligently and build one for himself, thus by example assur-
ing that his own shall be safe from violence when built.
I do not think that the essential harmony of liberty and equal-
ity, rightly understood, can be better or more eloquently
expressed than this.
III.
In his third question, Professor Anastaplo asks: "Does Mr.
Jaffa mean to leave the impression that theory alone deter-
mines political practice?" To this he adds: "Not enough seems
to be made by Mr. Jaffa of nature (or personal temperament)
and of circumstances in everyday political life. If he did make
more of these, he would not be as apt as he is to subject polit-
ical men to the most exacting philosophical scrutiny."
Let me reply, first of all, by saying that I was convinced
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long ago, as I believe Professor Anastaplo was, both by Aris-
totle and by Leo Strauss, that the best possible regime is one
ruled not by philosophers, but by gentlemen. The gentleman
qua gentleman does not need a reason for being moral. Indeed,
the true gentleman tends to regard the giving of such reasons
as demeaning. In this attitude lies both a gentleman's strength
and his weakness. But Leo Strauss, more than Aristotle, per-
suaded me that the philosophy that Socrates called down from
the heavens was a necessary adjunct to the regime of gentle-
men. This was because gentlemen qua gentlemen are nearly
defenseless against false gods and false theories. Such theories
might, and frequently do, destroy the ground of virtue in the
souls of non-gentlemen, and sometimes even in the souls of
gentlemen.
Gentlemanship means the activity of the moral virtues
guided by practical wisdom. Gentlemanship implies a harmony
between the moral virtues and the regime in which the gentle-
men predominate. Gentlemanship requires that the gods of the
city, in classical terminology, look with favor upon these vir-
tues and those who practice them. The rule of gentlemen is a
priori possible only within the cities that look to such gods.
Philosophy, insofar as it renders doubtful the belief in such
gods, or any gods, may justly be regarded as a doubtful bless-
ing, if not a curse. This is of course a fortiori true of the
poetry by which philosophic teachings are transmitted to the
young, and thereby to future citizens. Where the gods of the
cities are hostile to moral virtues, where they elevate bad faith,
cruelty, or selfishness over morality, it may be necessary for
Socratic philosophy to turn the city towards a more pure reli-
gion. Consider the quest of the King of the Khazars for a bet-
ter religion, in Judah Halevi's The Kuzari.
It may also happen that non-Socratic philosophy, or the
influence of such philosophy, may elevate bad faith, cruelty,
and selfishness over morality. We see this above all in
Machiavelli and the Machiavellians who, with notable excep-
tions, have dominated the theoretical landscape for over four
hundred years. We see this in the poetry that they have given
us as well as in their philosophy. We can see the pernicious
possibilities of philosophy and poetry more than a millennium
before Machiavelli in the comical, but serious, debate between
the just and the unjust in Aristophanes' C7ouds. From that
debate we may infer that a new Socrates, different from the
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one presented in the play, will and indeed must come to the
aid of the just speech, as he does in the encounter with
Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. The refuta-
tion of the thesis that justice is the interest of the stronger,
found in the first book of the Republic, must be seen as the
reversal of the result of the contest in Clouds. That encounter
between Socrates and Thrasymachus is reproduced, in its
essentials, in Lincoln's debates with Douglas in 1858. The Get-
tysburg address, as the last word in the Lincoln-Douglas
debates, is Socratic poetry in the service of gentlemanship and
morality.
The political life of the West was transformed by the
establishment of Christianity within the Roman empire. That
establishment was anticipated a century before by the exten-
sion of citizenship from Rome to the provinces. In principle,
and in its own collective mind, the city of Rome became the
world. Since there was now, in principle, but one city, there
could now, in principle, be but one God. This view was a pre-
cursor to the end of the ancient city, and of the possibility of a
natural harmony between gentlemanship and the gods of the
city.
Christian monotheism was not the religion of one particu-
lar people as was the monotheism of ancient Israel. In claim-
ing the authority of truth with respect to the human soul qua
human soul, Christian monotheism broke the bonds that had
hitherto connected the laws of each particular city with a par-
ticular God or gods. There was no such thing as an "establish-
ment of religion" in any ancient city. The idea of
establishment implied an act by a pre-established political
order. In the ancient city, however, the city arose from a pre-
existing relationship of men and their gods. The God of Israel
freed the Israelites from bondage, led them out of Egypt, gave
them their laws, and made them, by these acts, a polity. The
Christian God comes to sight as the savior of each individual
human'soul. He may break the bondage of Original Sin but
not the shackles of those compelled to "make bricks without
straw." The Christian God is not the lawgiver of a particular
polity.
The establishment of Christianity, by banning the ancient
gods, broke the bond between God or the gods and law that
had characterized ancient Israel, ancient Rome, and every
other ancient city. From this tension between the merely
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human and particular cause of law and the universal and
divine character of the justification of law, arose the millennial
struggle for supremacy between the secular and the sacred,
between Popes and Emperors within the Holy Roman empire.
This struggle continued in different forms throughout the
Reformation.
The ancient legislating gods required primarily obedience,
but the One God of a universal empire required primarily
faith, or belief. The political establishment of a universal reli-
gion elevated "theory" over "practice" in a way unknown in
the ancient world, creating a problem unanticipated in Aris-
totle's Politics. Political life henceforth was dominated, not by
the requirements of laws directing human actions as such, but
by the requirements of faith directing men's souls toward eter-
nity. If men's dearest interests were in another world, if the
interests which they shared with aliens and enemies who were
fellow-Christians were in some sense dearer than those they
shared with friends and fellow-citizens who may not have been
Christian, then citizenship became problematic in a way
unknown to the ancient city. Coercion in matters of faith,
coercion unrelated to morality or to disobedience to any laws
prescriptive of justice or the common good, was virtually
unknown in the ancient city. This coercion was incompatible
with the idea of gentlemanship and now became central to the
political process. Henceforth Western man was faced not with
the "political problem" but with the political-theological prob-
lem. One might, in this connection, consider the differences
between the laws against atheism in Plato's Laws and the laws
against heresy and infidelity in the Holy Roman Empire or in
any of the Christian states of the Reformation. These differ-
ences illuminate and indeed explain why the status of gen-
tlemanship, and of untheoretical politics, became so
problematic in the post-classical world.
Suffice it for the present that the foregoing problem
remained unsolved for nearly fifteen hundred years. Its solu-
tion is to be found in the principles of political obligation set
forth in the Declaration of Independence and in the principles
of religious liberty that.are set forth in the Virginia Statute of
Religious Liberty, both of them the work of Thomas Jefferson.
Of course, Jefferson's practical statesmanship was an out-
growth of the work of the philosophical statesmanship of Spi-
noza and of John Locke. It would, however, be a mistake to
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see Jefferson as nothing more than the epigone of his teachers.
The American Founding represents such a harmonization of
the claims of reason and of revelation as to make possible, per-
haps for the first time, the rule of Christian gentlemen.
The true theory of civil liberty may be found in Lincoln's
"abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times," that all
men are created equal, that there is no such distance between
man and man, as there is between man and beast, or between
man and God, implies that no man has any right to govern
another without the other's consent. This is the basis of the
rule of law, of ruling and of being ruled. A universal ground of
political obligation is found in the particular act of each con-
senting individual. Without any church or intervening reli-
gious authority, the sanction of monotheistic religion is
preserved nonetheless in the idea that the rights authorizing
the consent of the governed are rights with which we have
been endowed by our Creator. Respect for the rights of man
becomes a part of our duty to God.
Religious liberty is grounded in the metaphysical freedom
of the mind. Because of this freedom, coercion in matters of
faith is destructive of all merit in professions of faith. There-
fore, a man's civil rights can have no more dependence upon
his religious opinions than upon his opinions in physics or
geometry. These wise theories of civil and religious liberty are
necessary conditions of gentlemanship in the modern world,
not substitutes for it. But gentlemanship, the qualities neces-
sary for the deserved supremacy of the untheoretical moral
virtues within the political community, is possible only within
the framework of these theories. In this sense, the emancipa-
tion of practice from theory must be a work of theory.
Professor Anastaplo writes that "[i]t is imprudent to
regard as radically flawed human beings those political men
who hold dubious theoretical opinions." Such an attitude, he
adds, "can be discerned to have been critical to the intolerance
both of the Inquisition and of Stalin." To which I reply,
exactly so. But the decency of the gentleman was virtually
helpless against the Inquisition. This is illuniminated by the
scene in Dostoievski's Brothers Karamazov, in which Jesus, a
gentleman, was silent before the Grand Inquisitor's theoretical
arguments on behalf of tyranny. Moreover, since gentlemen
are ordinarily pious, their Christian piety is often at war with
their decency. It took the principle of separation of church and
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state, as set forth in the Virginia Statute, to reunite their piety
and their decency and thereby to liberate both their religious
faith and their gentlemanship.
Professor Anastaplo reminds us of the intolerance of Sta-
lin's regime, and he might have mentioned Hitler's as well.
This brings to mind how a morally neutral, or morally indiffer-
ent, Universal Science has replaced God as the highest author-
ity for modern man. He suggests, therefore, that the authority
of Science has been utilized to undermine morality, and
thereby gentlemanship and human decency. He reminds us
that the evil done in the name of Science is no less than what
was done, in an earlier age, by theological intolerance in the
name of God. The arguments vindicating the absolute author-
ity of the Party, as advanced in the confession of Rubachev
(Bukharin) at the Moscow show trials of 1936, as portrayed by
Koestler's Darkness at Noon, are virtually the same as those
vindicating the Inquisition, as portrayed by Dostoievski in The
Brothers Karamazov.
We must remember that two of the greatest minds of the
twentieth century were in the service of the two greatest
tyrants of all time, Heidegger for Hitler, and Alexander
Kojeve for Stalin. Gentlemanship is powerless to deal with
such a phenomenon. Only a Leo Strauss could make the case
against both Heidegger and Kojeve. The self-destruction of
reason in modern philosophy was the necessary condition for
the nihilistic loyalties generated in the regimes of Stalin and
Hitler. Only by Strauss's destruction of this self-destruction
has it been possible to restore the intelligibility of the political
horizon of gentleman.
Strauss made possible not only the restoration of gen-
tlemanship, but of that highest form of gentlemanship, states-
manship. It was Strauss who directed his students to both
Lincoln and Churchill, who not only were great gentlemen,
skilled in the political arts, but understood, as mere gentlemen
could not, the evil wrought in the practical and political world
by false theories. Without Strauss's destruction of historicism,
and without his restoration of the idea of understanding the
great books as their authors understood them, the attempt to
recapture the meaning of the statesman's art, by understand-
ing Lincoln and Churchill as they understood themselves,
would never have been possible.
According to Professor Anastaplo,
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Too much of an emphasis upon the theoretical may even be
seen in Mr. Jaffa's insistence upon the natural-right tradi-
tion of the Declaration of Independence to the virtual exclu-
sion of the prescriptive rights of the English-speaking
peoples. This is to ignore the central place given in the Dec-
laration to the grievances grounded in the British
Constitution.
In documents I have cited in "'Original Intentions' of the
Framers" it is clear that the elements of right in the British
Constitution to which the colonists appealed in the revolution,
were regarded by them as being at one and the same time, pre-
scriptive and natural. Therefore, with respect to this concept
of right, it was asserted that "it is an essential, unalterable
right, in nature, engrafted into the British Constitution, as a
fundamental law." Prescriptive right was authoritative only
when it was in accordance with or at least not contrary to nat-
ural right. I believe that all of the grievances mentioned in the
Declaration were regarded as violations of rights in nature.
They may also have represented violations of British constitu-
tionalism, but that in itself is merely incidental. Prescription,
by itself, could furnish no ground of right, once the die had
been cast for independence. In 1776, nothing lay closer to the
historical and prescriptive heart of the British Constitution
than the establishment of the Church of England with an
hereditary Protestant monarch at its head. But nothing was
more an anathema to Americans, after independence. Prescrip-
tion could no more make religious establishment or hereditary
monarchy acceptable than it could those "twin relics of barba-
rism, polygamy and slavery."
IV.
In his fourth question, Professor Anastaplo asks: "Is there
not an inevitable tension, because of the very nature of things,
between philosophy and the city?"
I believe I have already given the substance of my answer
to this question in the foregoing. Let me observe that the rela-
tionship between philosophy and the city is equally one of ten-
sion and of mutual dependence. Philosophy cannot subsist
without the city. But the health of the city depends, not upon
philosophy, but upon morality. The natural representative of
morality is not the philosopher, but the gentleman. However,
the gentleman cannot survive without the assistance, not of
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philosophy per se, as we see in the Clouds, but of political phi-
losophy, such as we see in the Republic and in the Lincoln-
Douglas debates.
Professor Anastaplo thinks it is unfair of me to hold polit-
ical men such as Mr. Meese, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tice Brennan to standards of theoretical scrutiny that, he
concedes, are proper in the case of a "professional philosopher"
like Leszek Kolakowski. But the former are essentially gen-
tlemen gone astray like the legendary Whiffenpoofs, while the
latter is merely pretentious.
Let us consider for a moment the phenomenon of "profes-
sional philosophy." A philosopher is by definition a lover, a
lover of wisdom. Another name for a professional love, how-
ever, is prostitute. At the risk of mixing my metaphors, how a
whole profession came to pin the tail of the donkey on itself, in
humorless unconsciousness of what it was doing, is a matter of
some curiosity. Philosophy became a profession, however, not
when those called philosophers accepted pay, but when they
became but one of the many disciplines of the modern univer-
sity. Each of these disciplines certified the competency of its
practitioners by a degree called doctor of philosophy. The orig-
inal pre-modern meaning of philosophy was that it was the
attempt to replace opinions about the whole universe by
knowledge of that whole. The recollection of this meaning is
preserved in the word "university," as characterizing the insti-
tutional home of philosophy. It is also preserved by the fact
that each of the disciplines called its peculiar, but very partial,
limited and non-philosophic knowledge "philosophy." Now,
however, a doctorate of philosophy in philosophy is only one of
many doctorates of philosophy. In more ways than one, as Leo
Strauss often said, the discipline now called philosophy is only
the rump of the original animal. Modern science, he said, rep-
resents the successful branches of modern philosophy, and
what is still called by the name of philosophy represents only
its residual elements.
I quoted from Professor Kolakowski's Jefferson lecture of
1986 at the beginning of Appendix B of "'Original Intentions'
of the Framers." The self-evident truths of the Declaration of
Independence were, he said, in the light of the philosophic tra-
dition "either patently false, meaningless, or superstitious." I
need not repeat what I have already said about this assertion.
The Declaration of Independence expresses an opinion about
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man, God, and the universe, seen as a whole. This wholeness is
simply beyond the range of Professor Kolakowski's compre-
hension. As a genuine "professional" he has no more notion of
what the Declaration of Independence meant than if it had
been inscribed on the Rosetta Stone. Truly, the rump does not
know what the head once thought. Whatever their shortcom-
ings, Mr. Meese, Chief Justices Rehnquist and Justice Brennan
are important people, because they hold, or have held, impor-
tant offices. Most of their errors are what have been certified
to them as truth by professional philosophers. This was nota-
bly evident in Rehnquist's casual and unquestioning acceptance
of the fact/value distinction. This distinction, which underlies
all of his jurisprudence, is one he accepted on authority, appar-
ently without the least acquaintance with the proofs, real or
alleged, upon which it rests.
I agree with Professor Anastaplo that we should address
the professional philosophers on their own turf, and he and I
have both done so. But we cannot wait to instruct jurists and
other political men until we have transformed the academic
study of philosophy. Political men are victims of false doc-
trines that are given currency by the academy, and given
authority by being characterized as science. As members of
the polity, we are all victimized by them together. In our free
society, resting as it does upon the exchange of ideas, we can be
emancipated only by truth, and truth rests upon hard reason-
ing, reasoning for which there is no substitute.
V.
In his fifth question, Professor Anastaplo asks: "Does Mr.
Jaffa mean to leave the impression that 'the consent of the
governed' is for the Declaration of Independence, as well as for
himself, a necessary basis for legitimate government in all
circumstances?"
Professor Anastaplo knows my answer to this so well that
I can only assume he is asking it on behalf of others. I have
remarked time and again that the consent referred to in the
second paragraph of the Declaration must be understood to
mean enlightened consent. In a memorable passage I often
quote, George Washington declared that "[t]he foundation of
our empire was not laid in the gloomy age of ignorance and
superstition, but at an epoch when the rights of mankind were
better understood and more clearly defined than at any former
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period." The Declaration itself refers to both "barbarous ages"
and "merciless savages." One must assume that the consent
that gives rise to the just powers of government is neither bar-
barous nor savage, but rather grounded in that understanding
of the rights of man of which Washington wrote. It may cer-
tainly be the case that, in ages and places of ignorance and
superstition, despotism in some form or other may become
legitimate because of necessity.
Certainly the existence in human societies of cannibalism,
human sacrifice, slavery, polygamy, suttee, or untouchability,
requires government that does not rest upon the consent of the
barbarians or savages themselves. In fact, the Civil War
amendments to the United States Constitution, although nomi-
nally grounded in consent, were, with full justification,
imposed upon the defeated South by the victorious Union
armies. Having fought for the principle that some men might
govern other men without their consent, the former Confeder-
ates could not reasonably complain of this compulsion on
behalf of consent. However paradoxical it may appear to be, it
was only by accepting the principles embodied in those amend-
ments that the erstwhile rebels could be re-admitted to a gov-
ernment grounded in the consent of the governed.
Barbarism, however, must not be equated with primitiv-
ism, as it cannot be in the case of those antebellum Americans
who fought for slavery, not as a necessary evil, but as a positive
good. There is scientific barbarism as well, represented in our
time by both Nazis and Communists. The failure of the Wei-
mar Republic to outlaw the Nazi and Communist parties
became the death sentence of much more than the Weimar
Republic itself. The adherents of these murderous regimes
had no more right than cannibals to participate in a free gov-
ernment. The right of revolution proclaimed in the Declara-
tion of Independence, the right to alter or abolish
governments, is a natural right to be exercised only when gov-
ernments become "destructive of these ends." The ends are
"to secure these rights," that is, the equal natural rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To destroy or to enslave
other human beings, whose rights are equal to our own, is not
a permissible end of the right of revolution. Nazis who fol-
lowed Hitler, or Communists who followed Stalin, had no right
to anything but an emancipation from their dangerous delu-
[Vol. 13:379
Seven Answers for Professor Anastaplo
sions. How this right might prudently be implemented is
another question. But the principle is clear.
Professor Anastaplo says that "the consent of the gov-
erned" in the Declaration of Independence "can be translated
into terms used by Plato and Aristotle, but not without signifi-
cant distortion. Certainly, Plato and Aristotle, as well as the
Bible, recognize the possibility of just regimes without benefit
of the consent of the governed. Mr. Jaffa, in his stance here,
seems more in the spirit of Rousseau . . . ." As I have argued
above, the problem of political obligation became a moral and
political problem only with the establishment of monotheism
as the predominant form of the religion of the West. For
Plato, Aristotle, and the Bible, the source of political obligation
was to be found in the divine lawgivers of the city. This is as
clear in Plato's Laws as it is in the Torah. One of the attrib-
utes of a gentleman is that he needs no argument as to why he
should be law-abiding. The Nicomachean Ethics is addressed
only to those who are already disposed towards virtue and are
only in need of instruction in how to become virtuous. How-
ever, as to most of the citizens, it is clear that for Aristotle as
for Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, the gods of the city remain
the ground of the obligation of law.
I have not distorted the relationship between the teaching
of the Declaration, and the teaching of the classics, because I
have never identified the two in the sense implied by Professor
Anastaplo. The classical political solutions are, strictly speak-
ing, only for the ancient city. The Declaration addressed a
problem peculiarly that of the Christian West; a problem that
was not addressed by Plato or Aristotle, arising from the con-
flicting claims of reason and of revelation. The idea of human
equality, independent of sectarian identity, led to the idea of
the enlightened consent of the governed as the ground of law.
This idea, that consent framed the basis of law, enfranchised
Aristotle's concept of law as "reason unaffected by desire" by
removing from the jurisdiction of theology and of theologians
the judgment of rationality. The Declaration was no less pious
in doing so, because it incorporated into the idea of enlightened
consent respect for the rights with which all mankind had
been endowed by their Creator. Thus, the Declaration made
obedience to law, based upon consent, among our duties to
God. In the Declaration, and more generally in the American
Founding, we find a principled ground for law that we cannot
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find in Aristotle. What we find, however, is fully in accordance
with Aristotle's intention, within a framework consistent with
biblical religion.
I believe my argument must be distinguished radically
from Rousseau's since it both admits and requires for its foun-
dation such an understanding of morality as one finds in the
Nicomachean Ethics. The consent arising from the general
will is a formal substitute for moral rationality, not a means of
implementing it. The moral rationality of the Nicomachean
Ethics and of the Politics, like that of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, is grounded in the objectivity of the distinctions
between man, beast, and God. These distinctions in turn imply
that "great chain of being" which is the metaphysical ground
of the universe, and the object of philosophical speculation.
For Rousseau, as I understand him, these distinctions have
blurred, and both philosophy and politics have thereby lost
their respective sovereignties.
VI.
In his sixth question, Professor Anastaplo asks, "Does Mr.
Jaffa recognize sufficiently the merits of that freedom which
he routinely subordinates to equality?"
In his second question, Professor Anastaplo challenged me
to recognize the shortcomings of equality, and now he repeats
the same question by calling my attention to the merits of free-
dom. But as he well knows, I deny the premise of both forms
of the question, and in particular deny that I, any more than
Abraham Lincoln, have ever subordinated freedom to equality.
I do not believe it is possible to do so, because the subordina-
tion of the one to the other would imply the misunderstanding
of both. The fact that black human beings and white human
beings are equally human beings is the ground of their equal
right to freedom. To deny one can only lead to the denial of
the other. To affirm one is also to affirm the other. As Alice
learned in Wonderland, words can be made to mean whatever
one wants them to mean. But in the vocabulary of Lincoln and
of the Declaration of Independence, no such distinction
between freedom and equality, such as that suggested by Pro-
fessor Anastaplo, is tenable. The Gettysburg Address moves
from the proposition of human equality, to the "new birth of
freedom," and hence to the preservation of popular govern-
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ment. That these three are one was surely Lincoln's faith, as
was his faith in the oneness of God.
For Lincoln, the essence of liberty, was to give to all an
equal chance. A fair start in the race of life is precisely the
ground upon which the recognition of excellence depends. In
removing the shackles of class, race, religion, and ethnic origin,
the principle of equality provides the rewards of liberty hith-
erto denied to talent and virtue.
Professor Anastaplo observes that "freedom can deterio-
rate into simply living as one likes," that is to say, into license.
We add here that the principle of equal rights can deteriorate
into what Leo Strauss called "permissive egalitarianism." It is
easy to see that, in their corruptions, freedom or liberty and
equality are one. But equality, uncorrupted, rests upon the
recognition of the inequality of man and beast, and of man and
God. This equality implies an objective order of being, upon
which is founded a prescriptive moral order. Liberty can dete-
riorate into license only as one forgets or ignores that one's lib-
erty arises from one's nature. Liberty can never be used to
reject or defy "the laws of nature and of nature's God." Our
equality with other human beings is an equality within the
boundaries of those same laws. It is an equality which arises
from our rational nature, and which obligates us to know and
to obey the laws of that nature. It is an equality not only of
one's rights, but of the duties arising from those rights. There
is no ground here for mere permissiveness.
VII.
Finally, in his seventh question, Professor Anastaplo asks:
"What more should be said on behalf of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Associate Justice Brennan with respect to the mat-
ters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa?"
He thus ends as he began, now entering pleas on behalf of
the two Justices, one conservative and the other liberal, as he
did on behalf of former Attorney General Meese. Professor
Anastaplo takes heart in the fact that "Justice Brennan could
say, upon the recent elevation of Justice Rehnquist, '[h]e's
going to be a splendid Chief Justice.'" From this he concludes
that "[d]ecent conservatives and decent liberals do have much
in common." But I would remind Professor Anastaplo that I
ended "'Original Intentions' of the Framers" with the observa-
tion based, I believe, upon compelling evidence, that "modern
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liberalism and modern conservatism . . .stand upon common
ground. They are mirror images of each other. They differ
only as to where Right and Left are located in the images."
Athough I have no doubt that Justice Brennan and Chief
Justice Rehnquist are decent men, it is not their decency that
is so conspicuous among the things they hold in common. It is
their denial of the idea of natural justice, of "the laws of
nature and of nature's God" that animated the generation of
the American Founding. I am certain that Chief Justice Taney
was every bit as decent a human being as Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist. He was a man of strong moral and religious convic-
tions, who was personally opposed to slavery and who freed his
own slaves. Had he lived his life in a private station, that life
might have been noted only for its purity and blamelessness.
But as Aristotle says, "rule shows the man." As Chief Justice
and author of the opinion of the Court in the case of Dred
Scott, Taney was one of history's greatest disasters. Justice
Brennan, albeit a decent man, concurred in the Court's deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade, which many competent judges both of law
and of decency regard as a disaster equaling, if not surpassing,
Dred Scott.
In Roe v. Wade, then Justice Rehnquist dissented on the
ground that the Court, in ruling unconstitutional the abortion
laws of fifty states, was usurping the legislative authority of
the people of those states. This opinion was, I believe, per-
fectly correct. I find no fault with Justice Rehnquist for care-
fully avoiding any moral arguments with respect to abortion.
In the circumstances of that case, such avoidance was correct.
I only observe that his dissent in Roe v. Wade, as far as it went,
was entirely consistent with his legal positivism. It is difficult
to imagine an exercise of state, or federal, legislative power
that Justice Rehnquist would not uphold.
Professor Anastaplo also has good things to say about Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's opinions with respect to the free speech
guarantee of the first amendment. He finds it "difficult to see
what practical differences there are likely to be, in terms of
how cases should be decided, between Mr. Jaffa and the Chief
Justice, whatever theoretical shortcomings Mr. Jaffa may dis-
cern in the Chief Justice." However, Rehnquist's patronage of
free speech is less an attachment to the cause of free speech,
seen as a necessary ingredient of free government, than it is a
manifestation of his inability to find any rational standard by
[Vol. 13:379
Seven Answers for Professor Anastaplo
which to distinguish free speech from any perversion or cor-
ruption of speech. What follows is a critique of the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion for the Court in the case of Falwell v. Flynt.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous
decision, reversed a lower court ruling, which had upheld a
jury's award of $200,000.00 to the Reverend Jerry Falwell in
his suit against Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine.
Flynt had published a fake advertisement for Campari
Liqueur, in which Falwell was portrayed as a drunk whose
first sexual experience had been with his mother in an out-
house. The jury held that since this "satire" had been labeled,
albeit in small print, as fiction, Falwell had not, strictly speak-
ing, been libeled. However, they awarded him damages for his
mental pain and suffering.
The jury clearly felt that the image conjured up in the
minds of many thousands of people of the young Falwell and
his mother in the outhouse, whether or not they had paid any
attention to the disclaimer, was so degrading and debasing that
Flynt should be punished and Falwell indemnified. But the
Supreme Court of the United States has decided that the jury
was wrong and that the representation of Falwell as having
had sex with his mother in an outhouse is speech protected by
the first amendment.
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the
speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that
he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred,
utterances honestly believed to contribute to the free
interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.
Thus spoke the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), in a
passage cited to justify the Falwell v. Flynt decision. But, can
the Court honestly believe that such a representation of the
Reverend Falwell and his mother contributes to "the free
interchange of ideas and the ascernment of truth?" Larry
Flynt, the publisher of Hustler, is a declared enemy of all
traditional morality and human decency, whether that of the
Bible or of unassisted human reason. Whether it is fornication,
adultery, incest, or sodomy, Flynt wishes to destroy the dignity
of moral restraint by mocking and ultimately destroying our
sense of shame with respect to such things. His intent was not
so much to make Falwell ridiculous as to make the horror of
incest and the dignity of the human family ridiculous. I, for
one, would not deny Flynt full freedom of speech to argue, if
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he wishes, that all moral precepts such as that embodied in the
prohibition of incest are primitive superstitions. But Flynt has
no interest whatever in the "free interchange of ideas," and he
has about as much interest in promoting "the ascertainment of
truth" as he has in promoting chastity. I do not think that
public exhibitions of shamelessness, or of pornographic exhibi-
tionism, have anything to do with promoting the ends of free
speech.
The opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who placed the case in the context of political
cartooning, as a feature of "public and political debate" in a
free society. He gave a number of examples of such cartoons,
beginning with one of George Washington riding a donkey,
with the caption underneath asking, "[w]hich one is the ass?"
Yet even Mr. Rehnquist sensed that it strained credulity to
imply that "the caricature of respondent and his mother in
Hustler" belonged to this genre. It was, he admitted, "at best a
distant cousin" of even the most acerbic and hostile of the
political cartoons he had described, "and a rather poor relation
at that." In fact, the Chief Justice admitted that Hustler's por-
trayal of Falwell and his mother did not really deserve first
amendment protection at all, but he thought that genuine
political cartoons and satire would be endangered unless it
received such protection. Rehnquist stated:
If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to
separate one from the other, public discourse would proba-
bly suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any
such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative
description "outrageous" does not supply one.
One might paraphrase the Chief Justice's argument at this
point, by saying that if we do not permit George Washington's
mother to be called an incestuous whore, we might prevent
someone from calling George Washington an ass!
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not deny that, however broad
the protections afforded speech by the first amendment's prin-
ciples they
like other principles, are subject to limitations. We recog-
nized in Pacifica Foundation, that speech that is "'vulgar,'
'offensive,' and 'shocking'" is "not entitled to absolute con-
stitutional protection under all circumstances." In Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, we held that a state could lawfully
punish an individual for the use of insulting "'fighting'
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words, those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
But, the Chief Justice concluded, "the sort of expression
involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any
exception of the general first amendment principles." It is dif-
ficult for us to imagine what expressions are exceptions and
not deserving of first amendment protection if calling a man's
mother an incestuous whore is insufficiently "vulgar, offensive,
and shocking." What insults are there that are so much more
insulting, as to constitute the "fighting words" of Chaplinsky?
Chief Justice Rehnquist thinks that "outrageousness in the
area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjective-
ness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on
the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis
of their dislike of a particular expression."
But why is "outrageousness" subjective, while "vulgar"
"offensive" and "shocking" are not? How do "outrageous"
words differ from "fighting" words with respect to their sub-
jectivity? I would wager that in a poll of adult American males,
the vast majority would say that calling a man's mother an
incestuous whore is ample justification for punching someone
in the nose. I am also confident that they would be supported
by the vast majority of American women. The public would be
amazed, I think, to learn that the insult to Reverend Falwell,
and to the memory of his mother, was merely subjective, and
that the jury's reaction to "whore" or "incest" was merely a
matter of taste, or that it merely reflected their subjective dis-
like of particular expressions. Furthermore, what happened to
the Chief Justice's famed jurisprudence of "original intent"?
There is not even a whisper of it. Here would have been an
occasion to have asked what the framers and ratifiers of the
first amendment had in mind, in distinguishing speech that
does deserve, from that which does not deserve, constitutional
protection. Are we not led to suspect that "original intent" is
invoked only when it supports the Chief Justice's own subjec-
tive "value judgments"?
Larry Flynt, shot by a previous outragee, is confined to a
wheelchair, and Reverend Falwell is a minister of the Gospel.
Hence, there was no question here of any recourse to physical
chastisement for redress. We may, however, recall the bloody
caning of Senator Sumner of Massachusetts on the floor of the
Senate by Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina in
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1856, one of the events presaging the Civil War. Sumner, in
"The Crime Against Kansas," had singled out Senator Andrew
P. Butler of South Carolina, for extraordinary vilification. In
the words of David Potter,
For good measure, Sumner had sneered at "the loose expec-
toration" of Senator Butler's speech, alluding to the imper-
fect labial control of an old man... Brooks, who was related
to Butler... felt the obligation of the southern code to retal-
iate for an insult to his elderly kinsman .... 4
We may be confident that the "southern code" is not merely a
geographical phenomenon and that it did not pass away with
the era of the Civil War. Those who are infuriated by what
they consider intolerable indignities, particularly to family
members, are just as likely now as then to turn to violence,
and all the more so if they believe that there is no legal
redress. This then is a setback, not a victory, for the cause of
free speech. This decision, moreover, may likely have a chilling
effect upon many who might enter public life, but are unwill-
ing to accept such abuse, particularly when it may be directed,
not against themselves, but against their wives, mothers, or
daughters.
Let me conclude my formal reply to Professor Anastaplo's
seventh query by reminding him of the legal positivism
grounded upon moral relativism, which constitutes the heart of
Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist holds
that all moral judgments are "value judgments," and as such,
they are equally indemonstrable and equally immune to
rational discrimination. All constitutional rights are grounded
in moral preferences or "values." Justice Rehnquist's opposi-
tion to "judicial activism" consists in holding that in a democ-
racy, the preferences of the people expressed through their
elected representatives, and not by non-elected judges, ought
to decide what these "values" mean and how they are to be
implemented. As I have already pointed out, however, this is a
non-sequitur. If all values are equally subjective there is no
reason to prefer one to another. There is nothing in a "prefer-
ence" for democracy that decides whose definition of democ-
racy one ought to prefer. Hence, there is nothing that requires
one to prefer the legislature's value judgments to the judici-
ary's. Chief Justice Rehnquist's preference for legislative over
4. The Impending Crisis, New York, Harper & Row, 1976 p. 210.
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judicial interpretation of the Constitution is based upon his
own definition of democracy, which is no more than his own
"value judgment."
What if the people themselves want the Supreme Court to
be the arbiter of the relationship between majority rule and
minority rights? If that is what the people want, why is it not
democratic? That was the thesis of Judge Bork's 1968 Fortune
article. It is precisely at this point that Justice Brennan, and
his followers, have the better of the argument. But, as Judge
Bork observed in the same article, the argument for the court
as arbiter of the relationship between majority rule and minor-
ity rights is grounded in what he called the Madisonian system
of natural rights. But this system, to use Bork's phraseology,
assumes that constitutional rights are derived, not from subjec-
tive "values," but from objective reality. According to
Madison, and all the Founding Fathers, nature is the unchang-
ing ground of our changing experience of the moral phenom-
ena. Value judgments are not. Principles derived from nature
do not evolve, as Justice Brennan supposes. Their application,
however, should be guided by prudence, which always reflects
an awareness not of changing principles, but of changing
circumstances.
While commending Chief Justice Rehnquist, Professor
Anastaplo also warns him, when he writes:
It is to be hoped that the Chief Justice will not so forget
himself and his high calling as to subvert the teaching func-
tion of his office by proclaiming from the bench what one of
his predecessors did (in order to justify packing some Com-
munist Party leaders off to jail in 1951) ....
What Professor Anastaplo found so offensive was the following
passage from Chief Justice Vinson's opinion for the Court in
Dennis v. United States:
Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle
that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard
has meaning only when associated with the considerations
which gave birth to the nomenclature .... To those who
would paralyze our government in the face of impending
threat by encasing it in a semantic strait jacket, we must
reply that all concepts are relative.
Professor Anastaplo and I agree that "the teaching function"
of the office of Chief Justice, and indeed of the Supreme Court
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as a whole, is not surpassed in importance by any of its other
functions. That is why I find Chief Justice Rehnquist's moral
relativism and legal positivism so harmful, even though they
do not always necessarily lead to opinions or decisions with
which I disagree.
I am quite confident, however, that Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, had he been sitting on the high Court in 1951, Professor
Anastaplo notwithstanding, would have agreed with the major-
ity and upheld the Smith Act. The same reasons that led him
to vote against the majority in Roe v. Wade would have led
him to vote not to usurp the legislative power of Congress to
decide upon the means to prevent the success of a conspiracy
to overthrow the government of the United States by force and
violence. I must confess that I think he would have been as
right in the one case as in the other. This does not mean that
it is impossible that the President and Congress might not in
fact be engaged in a conspiracy against the constitutional rights
of unpopular minorities.
As we shall see, Chief Justice Vinson conceded that the
Court must be prepared to review the action of Congress to
make sure that this does not happen. However, he held, there
is a strong presumption in favor of the political branches of the
government when it comes to political judgments as to the
political dangers that the country may be facing. Justices
Black and Douglas, in dissenting in the Dennis case, believed
that Congress in passing the Smith Act, and the executive, in
prosecuting Communist Party leaders under it, were simply
responding to a popular hysteria, and not responding to real
danger. I believe that these dissenting Justices, and those who,
like Professor Anastaplo, agree with them, were wrong.
Let me at this point enter my own dissent to Professor
Anastaplo's assumption that the Court's opinion in the Dennis
case rested upon moral relativism. The "relativistic" passage
which he cites is preceded by the assertion that "[t]he basis of
the first amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut
speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of
ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies. It is for
this reason that this Court has recognized the inherent value
of free discourse."
What Chief Justice Vinson called the "inherent value of
free discourse" is not what Chief Justice Rehnquist means by a
"political value judgment." Vinson implies that the benefits of
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free speech are intrinsic to the speech itself. Moreover, Chief
Justice Vinson is not a relativist when he declares that
"[s]peech is not an absolute, above and beyond control of the
legislature when its judgment, subject to review here, .is that
certain kinds of speech are so undesirable as to warrant crimi-
nal sanction." This is a mere truism, and one which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist repeated in the case of Falwell v. Flynt. All
speech is not free speech. Free speech has never been under-
stood to include the right falsely to shout "fire!" in a crowded
theater, or to include the right to libel, slander, obscenity,
fighting words, speech aimed at conspiracies in restraint of
trade, the speech of employers to their workers to dissuade
them from joining unions, and incitement to crime.
Among the kinds of speech inciting crime that Congress
has a right to prevent are speeches inciting acts to overthrow
the government by force and violence. It is generally recog-
nized that the speeches may be found criminal only to the
extent of the probability that criminal acts might actually
occur as a consequence of the speech. Falsely shouting "fire"
in an empty, rather than a crowded theater, might be judged
no crime at all. Or the "false" shout of "fire" might be part of
the play that the audience in the crowded theater is watching.
Of course, as already noted, Congress, or the President, may
not strike at someone's freedom of speech on the pretext that a
danger exists when there is none, and the Court has a duty to
consider whether such may not be the case. To repeat: that
the danger from the Communist Party was merely a pretext
engendered by hysteria was the hypothesis of Justices Black's
and Douglas' dissents. That there was reasonable ground for
regarding the danger as real was the hypothesis of Chief Jus-
tice Vinson's opinion for the Court. Who was right?
Constitutional cases are not decided in a vacuum. For
good or for ill, all law is a by-product of the political process.
Politics is the fundamental reality of which constitutional law
is an epiphenomenon. No answer to the foregoing question can
have any validity unless we are aware of the circumstances in
which the Smith Act was passed and of the events that inter-
vened between its passing and the prosecutions under it that
culminated in the Dennis case.
The Act was passed in 1940, at a time when the two bloodi-
est tyrants of all time, Hitler and Stalin, were allies. Nothing,
not even the Moscow trials of 1936, revealed the character of
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the American Communist Party, and the international organi-
zation of which it was a part, more completely than the rever-
sals of the Party line, first on August 23, 1939, and then on
June 22, 1941. Prior to the first of these two dates, American
Communists were supporting, with the fanatical zeal and rhe-
torical extravagance with which they pursued all their enter-
prises, a "popular front." This meant an alliance of the
Western "bourgeois" democracies and the Soviet Union against
"fascism," meaning the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. With the
signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, all talk of such a
"front" ceased. From the moment that France and Britain
declared war on Germany, shortly after the Nazi invasion of
Poland on September 1, 1939, the American Communist Party
declared that the war was one between capitalist powers and in
which the peoples of the world had no stake in the outcome.
Stalin's invasion and annexation of the eastern half of
Poland, which Hitler had agreed to in their pact, drew no criti-
cism whatever. Nor did the American Communist Party recog-
nize Stalin's murder of the entire Polish officer corps. The
Polish Army, in 1939, had surrendered to the Soviets as they
retreated from the Nazis. Some 15,000 commissioned officers
were interned separately from about 300,000 non-commissioned
officers and enlisted men. After the Nazi invasion of the
U.S.S.R. some 22 months later, the Polish Army, minus its
officers, who were never again seen alive, was released from
internment and formed into units of the Red Army to fight
against the Wehrmacht, which they did very effectively. The
bodies of fewer than half the missing officers were discovered
by the Nazis in July, 1941, in shallow graves in the Katyn For-
est, in what had been Soviet-occupied Poland. That they had
been dead long before the Nazi invasion was confirmed at the
time by the International Red Cross. Of course, Stalin's propa-
ganda machine denied the allegations and called it all a Nazi
plot. But the Poles and Western intelligence knew that what
the Red Cross confirmed was true.
After the fall of France in June, 1940, with all of western
Europe subjugated, Hitler stood at the very summit of his for-
tunes and on the very edge of complete victory. If the Nazi
occupation of eastern and western Europe was any threat to
the future of human freedom, the American Communist Party
failed to recognize it. If there was any danger to the United
States from what appeared to be the imminent conquest of
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Churchill's Britain, the American Communist Party failed to
notice it. All this changed overnight, however, when on June
21, 1941, the Wehrmacht crossed the Soviet border. Then, and
only then, did Hitler again become the threat to freedom
which the American Communists had recognized before
August 23, 1939.
Since the end of the Second World War, Communists, and
their dupes and apologists, have insisted that Stalin's agree-
ment with Hitler in August, 1939, was intended only to buy
time to prepare for the assault that he knew was coming. The
real guilt, they say, was that of the Western appeasers, who at
Munich deliberately turned Hitler to the East, expecting that if
he were given a free hand to build his empire there, he would
leave the West alone. Churchill called this feeding the croco-
dile, in the hope that he would eat you last.
As a rejection of the policy of appeasement, taken by
itself, the position of the Communists is perfectly correct.
Everything in Hitler's propaganda, about Slavs, Jews, and Bol-
sheviks, suggested that the Drang nach Osten was what he
cared about most. As a justification of Stalin's deal with
Hitler, which unleashed the assault upon Poland and initiated
the Second World War, it is one of history's damndest lies. It
implies that Stalin anticipated Hitler's attack and was prepar-
ing for it. In fact, Stalin stubbornly refused to believe that the
attack was imminent, even up to the minute before it began.
The movement of German troops, tanks, artillery, and supplies
to the Soviet borders was so enormous that there could
scarcely have been anyone in Europe who was not aware of it.
Both Roosevelt and Churchill sent warnings to Stalin that
were ignored. In all, they were capitalists, and Hitler was a
brother socialist. History does not record a more paranoid
assassin than Josef Stalin: before the war he had murdered
almost all of his old Bolshevik comrades and had wiped out
virtually the entire officer corps of the Red Army, upon suspi-
cions that no one else believed or dared to challenge. Yet Sta-
lin, for one time only in his life, put his trust in someone, and
that someone was Adolf Hitler.
The evidence of that trust is found in the circumstances
that cost the Red Army, in the early weeks of the war, several
million men, two million of whom died in captivity. Not only
were the Soviet divisions not in a state of readiness, but whole
army groups were deployed in positions near the frontiers
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where they were exposed to the same blitzkrieg tactics that
had destroyed the French army only a year before. Every
school child in Russia knew that Russian strategy in dealing
with Napoleon consisted of counterattacking after allowing the
invader to dissipate his forces over the great distances, bad
roads, and bad winters of Russia. In the end, this is how the
Russians defeated the Wehrmacht. But they probably took
more than twice the casualties that they would have taken had
Stalin not been such an incompetent dupe. Hitler's attack
employed little deception and yet he achieved complete tactical
surprise. These facts refute any idea that Stalin had been
warily preparing for the assault he knew was coming.
If one takes into account Stalin's aid to Hitler's war
machine during the period of their collaboration, it is impossi-
ble to accept the justification that Stalin was buying time in
order to prepare for Hitler's attack. His pact with Hitler went
far beyond non-aggression. Pursuant to his agreement with
Hitler, he had greedily annexed the eastern half of Poland,
together with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and parts of Finland,
eastern Galicia, and Bessarabia. Pursuant to secret elements in
the same agreement, he supplied the German war machine
with huge supplies of all kinds, principally oil and grain.
Indeed, at the very moment the Wehrmacht crossed the Soviet
frontier, there were hundreds of loaded Russian freight cars
moving supplies towards German destinations.
We should remember that it was the British blockade
which brought Germany to her knees in World War I. When
Germany surrendered in 1918, her armies were still in France
and were unconquered in the field. But the home front behind
them had collapsed because of food and material shortages.
Had Hitler kept his part of the bargain, Stalin's pact with him
would have assured Germany that this would not happen
again.
Stalin must have seen that Hitler's true goal after the fall
of France was the defeat of Britain. We have Liddell Hart's
assurance that Hitler could almost certainly have accomplished
this defeat had he concentrated his resources upon the Battle
of the Atlantic. Churchill virtually concedes as much in his
history of the Second World War. Stalin must have known, as
President Roosevelt knew, that if Britain fell, an overwhelm-
ing maritime supremacy would have fallen to the Axis. Had
Hitler controlled the British fleet, together with the German,
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French, and Italian fleets he would, together with Japan, have
so surpassed the United States in naval power and resources as
to leave its coasts indefensible. The United States would have
had no option but to accommodate itself to Hitler's new world
order.
From every rational point of view, it was Britain, not Rus-
sia, that stood between Hitler and his dreams of a Thousand-
Year Reich. With victory over Britain, the Third Reich, in
partnership with Italy and Japan, would have inherited the
British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Belgian colonial
empires. All this was within Hitler's reach, if only he had
retained Stalin as his partner. Stalin never expected him to
jeopardize such sure success by making Napoleon's mistakes
all over again. Yet this is what Hitler did. But let us make no
mistake about it: the policy supported by the American Com-
munist Party was one which envisaged the end of American
freedom in a world dominated by Hitler and his allies, includ-
ing the U.S.S.R. The offer of a junior partnership in the Thou-
sand Year Reich, which Churchill rejected with such scorn
after the fall of France, was eagerly sought by Stalin and his
followers.
The American Communists were not the isolated band of
crackpot revolutionaries Justices Douglas and Black supposed
them to be in their dissenting opinions in the Dennis case.
However ineffectual they might have appeared to others, every
one of them carried his marshal's baton in his knapsack. Their
purpose was not merely to hold academic seminars on Marx-
ism-Leninism. The American Communist Party was no more
"theoretical" than the powerless radicals who surrounded
Lenin in Zurich. "To the Finland Station" was inscribed on
their banners, as it was on the banners of all the members of
the Comintern. The "seminars," like Lenin's in Zurich, were
designed to create the morale that would enable them to serve
as Fifth Columns, and as the core of future governments. This
is what the Nazi organizations in Norway and the Communist
parties in eastern Europe did, and what the Bunds in the
United States and Latin America were prepared to do. The
American Communist Party, during the period of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, at the time the Smith Act was passed, expected to
be the vanguard of a new totalitarian world order, in which
democracy and civil liberties would be wiped from the face of
the earth.
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Six months after the Wehrmacht invaded the U.S.S.R., the
United States was attacked by Japan, and shortly thereafter
Hitler declared war on the United States. The United States
and the U.S.S.R. became allies. The United States had begun
providing lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. even before Pearl Har-
bor. It continued to do so, in ever increasing amounts, up until
the final victory in Europe. Thereafter it supplied food, fuel,
and medical supplies to the Russian people, as it did to war
ravaged peoples everywhere. From the moment the United
States entered the war on the side of the U.S.S.R., the Ameri-
can Communist Party gave full support to the American war
effort. Communists enlisted and served with distinction in all
theaters, many attaining high rank as officers. But the Party
always regarded as paramount Stalin's interests as he under-
stood them. This was evident when the clamor arose in 1942
for a "second front now."
An attempted invasion of Europe by Anglo-American
forces in that year would have been disastrous. Only
Churchill's influence prevented it. There were many lesser
episodes of this kind, nearly all of them exploiting ancient
American prejudices against British "imperialism," with the
effect of steadily lessening Churchill's influence in the strate-
gic planning of the combined chiefs. As Leo Strauss was wont
to say, the American conception of an empire, encouraged by
the Communist Party, was one of a regime whose dominions
were separated by water.
When the war ended, the admiration and affection of the
American people and their government towards the Red
Army, the Soviet peoples, and "Uncle Joe" was boundless.
There was no largess that would have been denied to the Sovi-
ets in helping them to repair the devastation of war and to
rebuild their economy. The Soviet Union and all of eastern
Europe was invited to participate in the Marshall Plan. In the
Baruch Plan of 1946, the United States offered to place its
nuclear weapons program under international control in a
partnership with the U.S.S.R., which had not yet detonated its
first nuclear device. These overtures were refused by Stalin
and the Iron Curtain descended. Communist Parties under Sta-
lin's absolute control, backed by the Red Army and the Secret
Police, imposed on eastern Europe a despotism every bit as
ruthless as the one from which they had so recently been liber-
ated. Stalin's pledges, made at Yalta, to provide free elections
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in eastern Europe were ruthlessly thrust aside. The Cold War
had begun. Once again, the American Communist Party
showed unmistakably where its unquestioned loyalties lay. It
blindly endorsed Stalin's tyranny in everything it did, and
worked tirelessly to obstruct and oppose every effort to resist
and contain the spread of the new Soviet empire. But, the
American Communist Party had important allies in its crusade
because the pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists were nearly as vig-
orous in opposing resistance to Stalin as they once had been
with respect to Hitler.
In the politics of those years, the myth that the Commu-
nist Party was just an American political party, and not part of
an international conspiracy, was an essential feature of
Stalinist propaganda. Because it co-opted the rhetoric of lib-
eral democracy and of liberal internationalism, Communism
was in certain respects a greater danger than National Social-
ism had been. In the name of Communism, Stalin claimed to
speak for the whole human race, where Hitler had spoken only
of Aryan supremacy. In denying credibility to this Stalinist
myth, the prosecutions under the Smith Act, like the prosecu-
tion of Alger Hiss and the Truman administration's loyalty and
security programs, performed a necessary and invaluable polit-
ical service. Together with the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee of the House, and the Internal Security Committee of
the Senate, they voiced those fears of the American people
that enabled them to come to grips with their new interna-
tional responsibilities: preserving from Stalin the freedom
which they had just saved from Hitler and the Axis.
In the years following the war, Stalin came very close to
succeeding where Hitler had failed. In 1946, in the words of
Winston Churchill, nothing stood between the Red Army and
the English Channel but the American monopoly of the atom
bomb. Churchill's Iron Curtain speech sounded the tocsin of
Western resistance and led to the formation of NATO. The
unheeded advice which he had given a decade earlier now fell
on more receptive ears. The disintegration of the Stalinist
empire, which we may be witnessing four decades later, was
what Churchill prophesied would happen if the West stayed
the course against it. As he said in the Iron Curtain speech, the
Russian Communists did not want war, they wanted only the
fruits of war.
Professor Anastaplo and I do not, I think, differ on the
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essential nature of the free speech guarantees of the first
amendment. We differ concerning the Dennis case because we
differ as to the facts concerning the nature of the Communist
conspiracy, both at the time of the passage of the Smith Act
and at the time of the prosecutions of the Communist Party
members in 1950. In The Constitutionalist, Professor Anas-
taplo quotes the following from Justice Black's dissent in
Dennis:
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to over-
throw the Government. They were not charged with overt
acts of any kind .... They were not even charged with say-
ing anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the
Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble
and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date: The
indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist
Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publica-
tions in the future to teach and advocate the forcible over-
throw of the Government ....
The political naivete of this passage is remarkable consid-
ering that, when it was written, the United States, under the
aegis of the United Nations, was at war with communist North
Korea, a nation supported and supplied by Stalin. Needless to
say, the American Communist Party took the communist, not
the American, view of this conflict. It was also widely believed
at the time, correctly in my opinion, that Stalin's goals in this
conflict were not only to dominate Japan and the Far East, but
to drain American military power into the Far East as to com-
pel its disengagement from Europe.
In The Constitutionalist, Professor Anastaplo reproduces
passages from a letter of Earl Browder, published in the New
York Times of January 8, 1954. Browder writes that he had
given sworn testimony before a Senate Committee "that the
Communist Party under my leadership from 1930 to 1945 was
not a conspiracy for the overthrow of the existing Government
of the United States, that it did not engage in espionage for
Russia, that it did not accept orders from Moscow, and did not
wish to subordinate America to Russia."
It is not clear whether Professor Anastaplo expects us to
take this assertion seriously. No one who accepted the evi-
dence upon which Alger Hiss's conviction in 1948 was based
could doubt that members of the American Communist Party
engaged in espionage. Concerning the denial by Browder that
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the Party was engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the gov-
ernment of the United States, I submit the following from an
interview by Roy Howard with Stalin, published in the New
York World-Telegram of March 4, 1936. At one point in the
discussion, Howard called to Stalin's attention Mr. Litvinov's
letter of November 16, 1933, to President Roosevelt, containing
the famous paragraph 4, reading:
not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of
any organization or group... which has as an aim the over-
throw or the preparation for the overthrow of ... the polit-
ical or social order . . .of the United States .... [Italics
added.]
Howard then asked Stalin, "[d]id not Browder and Darcy,
American Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress
of the Communist International in Moscow last summer,
appeal for the overthrow by force of the American govern-
ment?" Stalin replied:
I don't recall what Browder and Darcy said. Maybe they
said something of that nature, but the Soviet people did not
found the American Communist party. The American Com-
munist Party was created by Americans. Its existence in the
United States is legal .... What Browder and Darcy may
have said in Moscow probably will be said a hundred times
in stronger terms on American soil. It would be unfair to
hold the Soviet government responsible for the activities of
American Communists.
No Muscovite since Stalin would doubt Stalin's disingenu-
ousness in pretending not to remember what Browder and
Darcy said. There were no speeches at the Seventh Congress
that had not been approved beforehand by the Kremlin, if not
actually written under its direction. In any case, we have Roy
Howard's word for it that Browder and Darcy had in fact
called for the overthrow of the American government. In
remarking that what Browder and Darcy "may have said" in
Moscow would be said "a hundred times stronger on American
soil," Stalin indicates that Browder was lying in the 1954 letter
to the New York Times.
Roy Howard then pressed Stalin, asking "is it not a fact
that their activities [those of the American Communist Party
at the Seventh Congress] occurred on Soviet soil contrary to
the terms of paragraph 4?" Stalin's reply was as follows:
"[y]ou mention the activity of American Communists on Soviet
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soil; what does activity of the Communist party mean? Organi-
zation meetings, sometimes strikes, demonstrations, etc. They
couldn't possibly organize them on Soviet soil. We have no
American workers in the U.S.S.R."
If, as Stalin implies, the functions of the American Com-
munist Party were directed to organizing American workers,
why were Browder and Darcy in Moscow at all? Above all,
why were they, as part of an American political party repre-
sented by ballot in national elections, noted even by Stalin as
calling for the overthrow by force of the American govern-
ment? Is it not plain that they were doing so as members of
the Communist International, and that this was no mere aca-
demic exercise in Marxism-Leninism? Their intent, at every
level of their activity, was to act to as great an extent as possi-
ble with other Communist parties and governments to bring
about a condition in which the overthrow of the government of
the United States would become possible. This was precisely
what they were charged with doing under the Smith Act.
From all of the foregoing, I conclude that the result
reached by the Court in the Dennis case, whatever its techni-
cal legal merits or demerits, was fundamentally sound.
A word must be said about the political sentiment of anti-
Communism, sometimes called "McCarthyism," in the period
following World War II. Professor Anastaplo was to some
extent a victim of this sentiment, when, in 1950, he was asked
by the character committee of the Illinois bar the wholly
improper question whether he had ever been a member of that
unpleasant band of enemies of human freedom, the American
Communist Party. I say the question was improper since there
was no ground for supposing that Professor Anastaplo, any
more than the man asking the question, had ever counte-
nanced the aims of the Communist Party. It was also irra-
tional because, as the case of Alger Hiss proved, had he been a
secret Communist he would not have hesitated for a moment
to deny his connection with that party. It was apparent from
the outset that Professor Anastaplo refused to answer the
question because the very idea that he might have been a Com-
munist impugned his integrity, and he believed that in defend-
ing that integrity he was defending the integrity of the
American Constitution and the principles upon which it was
based, the principles of the Declaration of Independence.
I think it important to recognize that there was no differ-
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ence between Professor Anastaplo and his inquisitors as to the
tyrannical nature of Communism. His inquisitors failed to
realize that the very reason for his refusing to answer their
questions was what made him an indomitable enemy of tyr-
anny. He, on the other hand, failed to realize the importance
of the political exigencies under which they labored, which
were due to the treachery of Stalin and his American allies.
The political change that had led to the replacement of Henry
Wallace with Harry Truman as Roosevelt's Vice-President in
1945 measures how close Stalin might have come to complete
success in the years immediately following Roosevelt's death.
Nothing could have prevented Stalin's complete victory
over freedom, had the President of the United States been his
witting, or even unwitting, accomplice. Furthermore, Wal-
lace's behavior in the years following 1946 provides ample rea-
son for believing he would have been just such an accomplice:
Wallace belonged to the ranks of those who saw in Truman's
Churchillian resistance to Stalin a betrayal of the legacy of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. For these people, British imperialism,
symbolized by Churchill, and not Communism, was the real
enemy. It was Truman who invited Churchill to Westminster,
Missouri, and who sat on the platform as he delivered the Iron
Curtain speech. In the eyes of the political left, Truman soon
became, along with Churchill, an arch demon of the Cold War.
At the same time, it was Truman's supreme political achieve-
ment to persuade the Republicans, in the person of Senator
Vandenberg, to abandon their isolationism, while persuading
the Democratic Party to abandon Roosevelt's fatuous illusions
about Stalin. Truman's expulsions of Wallace from his cabinet,
and of Wallace's followers from the government were a neces-
sary foundation for the anti-Communist foreign policy he fol-
lowed from late 1946 onwards. The loyalty-security programs
of the Truman years were the heart of what later was incor-
rectly known as "McCarthyism."
The driving out of the government of the Communist and
proto-Communist followers of Wallace was a necessity for Tru-
man's policy of containment. Because of it, Wallace broke with
the regular Democratic Party and formed the Progressive
Party in the 1948 presidential election. By doing so, he hoped
to split the Democratic vote and defeat Truman. But it was
precisely the rallying behind Wallace by the Communists and
their fellow-travelers that proved Truman's anti-Communist
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credentials to the American people, and led to his stunning
upset victory. All this is brilliantly explained and documented
in Samuel Lubell's The Future of American Politics, the defin-
itive work on the 1948 presidential election. It would have
been more than one could reasonably have expected of human
nature to think that the politics that had carried Truman to
victory in 1948 would have been abandoned in 1950. But in a
popular government such as ours, it would have been impossi-
ble to carry on a bipartisan foreign policy, representing a break
with strong traditions in both parties, without the strongest
popular support.
I would conclude by reminding my readers that, before the
publication of Crisis of the House Divided, American historical
scholarship was nearly unanimous in condemning Lincoln for
fanning the flames of the slavery controversy, in the House
Divided speech, and in the Lincoln-Douglas debates. It was
said that he exploited an emotion-laden issue for the sake of
his own political ambition. This same scholarship saw the Civil
War as an unnecessary war, because the question that divided
North and South was a moral question, which could not be
resolved by any rational means. It was thought that true
statesmanship would have worked for a practical solution that
ignored the moral differences.
Lincoln's policy was one of containing slavery and prevent-
ing its spread, although leaving it untouched, ultimately to
wither and die in the states in which it already existed. What
Lincoln saw as fundamental to that policy was recognition of
the moral wrong of slavery. Without recognizing that, the peo-
ple would not be prepared to make the sacrifices that might be
required to oppose the spread of slavery. All the practical
compromises that ignored the moral question would sooner or
later break down, Lincoln thought, because it would always be
in someone's interest to enslave other human beings. It seems
to me that Churchill's, Truman's, and Strauss's policy with
respect to Communism directly parallels Lincoln's with respect
to slavery. Like Lincoln's policy, if it was to succeed, it
required, first and foremost, a moral condemnation of Commu-
nism in the popular mind. It required a hatred of Commu-
nism, like slavery, as something intrinsically evil. Such moral
condemnations cannot be expressed with the equivocations and
reservations of philosophic casuistry. The hunt for copper-
heads during the Civil War was not always as humane or
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restrained as Lincoln himself might have wished. What was
supremely important was that the Union was preserved, slav-
ery was destroyed, and the rule of law as an expression of
human equality was vindicated. If we see Communism today
beginning to reveal itself to be "in the course of ultimate
extinction," and I pray we do, it is because, like slavery in 1860,
it was resisted at the crest of its power, at a moment when it
might easily have triumphed.
AN ANSWER To THE EPILOGUE
To his seven questions, Professor Anastaplo has added
three appendices. These are lectures, given at different times,
not originally directed specifically to me. Nonetheless, they
have the most profound relevance to the ground, not only of
American constitutionalism, but of all constitutionalism, as
seen in the light of the work of Leo Strauss.
A. The Founders of Our Founders: Jerusalem, Athens and
the American Constitution
The lifework of Strauss can perhaps best be summarized
as the attempt to comprehend the meaning of that civilization
constituted in its center and at its peak by Jerusalem and Ath-
ens. Strauss's work, of course, was also an attempt to preserve
such a civilization from the self-destruction of reason, and the
destruction of faith wrought by modern philosophy.
The lifework of Professor Anastaplo, and of myself, can
perhaps be best understood in the light of the relationship of
Jerusalem and Athens to the American Constitution or, alter-
natively, of the relationship of the American Constitution to
Jerusalem and Athens. Our work also is devoted, of course, to
preserving the dignity of the American Founding from the cor-
rosive effects of that relativism, dissolving into nihilism,
against which Strauss had warned.
Professor Anastaplo has raised for my consideration this
question: Is not the American Constitution, as an expression
of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, an
expression of the attempt by modern philosophy to solve the
problem of political life by lowering its goals? That is, is it an
attempt to remove from political concern and contention dif-
ferences concerning what is the human good, the good of the
human soul, which is the central concern of both classical phi-
losophy and of the Bible? Further, is it an effort to replace
that concern with concern for the good of the body? Professor
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Anastaplo has, I believe, indicated his own position with
respect to this question by declaring "the Founders of Our
Founders" to be Jerusalem and Athens.
However, Professor Anastaplo wishes me to address this
question because there are among the "Straussians" those who
maintain, whether in his own person or disguised as John
Locke, that the true philosophic progenitor of the American
Constitution is the radically modern Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes
replaced the summum bonum with the summum malum, fear
of violent death, as the central concern of political philosophy.
Hobbes was able to do this by insisting that the only ultimate
reality was body and its motions, that the only good of a body
possessed of sensation was pleasure, and that the idea of an
immaterial soul, or an immaterial God or good, was a delusion.
According to this school, the Founders and Hobbes believed
that while maintaining outward piety, mankind might, once it
had been persuaded to accept materialism, hedonism, and athe-
ism as the ground of political life, enjoy an immortal peace.
From this perspective the true, albeit clandestine, inten-
tion of the Founders was a regime that might sing of the Star
Spangled Banner, while being in truth "the land of the fearful
and the home of the coward." There would then be little ulti-
mate difference between a regime built upon the principles of
the Declaration of Independence, and one built upon the prin-
ciples of the Communist Manifesto. Marx is seen as a latter
day version of Hobbes, more specifically, of Hobbes so modified
by Rousseau that modern natural right is transformed into his-
tory. If the difference between Capitalism and Communism
becomes one of means, and not of ends, an intelligent Commu-
nist might be persuaded that a free market and not centrally
directed collectivism is the true road to peace and prosperity.
But we may be confident that "the God that failed" Commu-
nism would in the end also fail a liberal democracy that had no
higher view of man and his destiny than that of Hobbes or
Marx. That the free market can prevent the dehumanization
of man is no part of the argument of free market economics. I
think, as I believe Professor Anastaplo does, that a mankind
dehumanized by Hobbes's or Marx's (or their nihilist succes-
sors') conception of the soul might be as likely to seek its ful-
fillment in war and genocide, as in peacefully grazing in the
lush meadows of modern consumption.
However plausible the view of the American Founding as
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radically modern Hobbesian, crypto-Marxist, or neo-nihilist, it
is radically mistaken because it ignores the way in which the
Founding Fathers and Abraham Lincoln understood them-
selves. The radically modern view has been plausible, I might
add, because of the successful sophistry with which material-
ism, atheism, and hedonism have for over four centuries
presented themselves as alone consistent with the ground of
modern science. Science has been visibly and tangibly success-
ful in providing, through technology, the goods of the body,
both by increasing the supply of goods for consumption, and by
conquering so many of the diseases to which the body, by the
uncontrolled efficient causes in nature, is heir. These are the
very things, health and wealth, for which most people, through
most of human history, have prayed. Certainly, what is called
religion today often, whether consciously or not, replaces God
with science, even as it prays to God, as when people pray that
science will find a cure for cancer, or for AIDS. One might
even say that the consummation of contemporary religion,
from its own point of view, would come on that day when Sci-
ence had answered all its prayers, for health, wealth, peace,
and freedom. There would then be nothing left to pray for,
and God might be conveniently forgotten. This is what Hobbes
and Marx expected to happen. The withering away of the
State and the withering away of revealed religion, not to men-
tion philosophy, are part of the same process.
The virtues of science are not to be gainsaid. The question
with which we are faced is not whether the goods of Science
are real, nor whether the free market and democratic institu-
tions are not better able than Communist institutions to pro-
duce such goods and deliver them with reasonable fairness.
That the needs of the body should be satisfied decently is not
to deny that they should be satisfied. The question is whether
the Founding Fathers believed, any more than the representa-
tives of Athens and Jerusalem, that the goods of the body are
the only, or the most important, of human goods. Did they not
believe, as I think Professor Anastaplo and I believe, that the
goods of the body are conducive to genuine happiness only
when they are in the service of the immaterial goods of the
soul? Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics says that men wish
for and pray for the external goods. But, he says, what they
should pray for is that these goods be good for them. The men
who pledged to each other their lives, fortunes, and sacred
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honor meant to found a regime in which life, liberty, and prop-
erty would be more secure than in any regime which had pre-
ceded it. But, they were keenly aware that concern with a long
and prosperous life could be either honorable or dishonorable.
Only an honorable concern would have been consistent with
their intentions as Founders. They could not, therefore, have
been disciples of someone, for example, Hobbes, who taught
that courage was not a virtue, and that honor was not a good.
Leo Strauss, writing of Aristotle's Politics, observes that
"[t]he moral virtues cannot be understood as being for the sake
of the city since the city must be understood as being for the
sake of the practice of moral virtue." To this he added that
"Aristotle is the founder of political science because he is the
discoverer of moral virtue."
We would note that Aristotle's understanding of the rela-
tionship of morality and the city, as endorsed by Strauss, is
precisely the one I attribute to the American Founding
Fathers. To say, on the contrary, that morality is for the sake
of the city implies that the non-moral ends of the city deter-
mine the content and character of morality. This would be the
Machiavellian reversal of Aristotle which the Founding
Fathers rejected. I believe that this, or something very similar,
is what Strauss had in mind when he wrote, in Thoughts on
Machiavelli, that "[tjhe United States of America may be said
to be the only country in the world which was founded in
explicit opposition to Machiavellian principles."
Be it remembered -that the United States justified itself,
that is to say, maintained that it was acting justly, by invoking
"the laws of nature and of nature's God." Clearly these laws
were understood to be moral laws, as is confirmed by the fact
that the signers of the Declaration appealed to "the Supreme
Judge of the world for the rectitude of [their] intentions." But
it is equally clear that these laws were understood to be ante-
cedent to, and independent of, the will of those who were
founding a new regime. The American Founding Fathers can-
not then be understood as Machiavellian princes.
That the American Founding lowered the goals of political
life is presumed shown by its supposed rejection of both the
best regime of classical political philosophy, and the truths of
divine revelation, as the guiding theme of its politics. Those
who see the American Founding as Hobbesian believe that
classical reason and biblical revelation have been replaced by
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comfortable self-preservation. But the American Founding,
the novus ordo seclorum, understood itself to be the best
regime of Western civilization, not the best regime of Plato or
Aristotle and not the best regime according to the Bible. It
understood itself in this novel way precisely because it
addressed itself to a peaceful and civilized resolution of the
conflict between these two conceptions concerning what was
the best regime. These conflicting roots of the civilization they
found within their own souls might now flourish in this new
kind of polity. "Free argument and debate" would replace the
demand for orthodoxy and the punishment of heresy as attrib-
utes of good government. Thus the Founding Fathers believed
that it was possible to have the grandeur without the misery of
the equal presence within their regime, of Jerusalem and Ath-
ens. The American doctrine of separation of church and state
transformed the theoretical dissonance of Jerusalem and Ath-
ens into a practical harmony.
Professor Anastaplo writes that "thoughtful men have
worked out responsible accommodations between these con-
tending approaches" between Jerusalem and Athens. To this
he adds that "however smooth and enduring an accommoda-
tion may be, it cannot help but regard one or the other of the
two approaches as ultimately authoritative." I do not, how-
ever, regard the resolution found in the American Founding
merely in the light of an accommodation, however smooth and
enduring. It was indeed an accommodation, but one grounded
upon principle. As I have argued above, the end of the ancient
world, marked by the extension of Roman citizenship to the
provinces, followed by the establishment of Christianity, cre-
ated a problem unprecedented in human history. All law in
the ancient city was, directly or indirectly, divine law. By
breaking the link between God and law, the Roman Empire,
having become "holy" according to its own understanding of
itself, understood political obligation as devolving from Pope
and/or Emperor downward to the lower ranks of polities and
of persons. This, however, gave little ground either for individ-
ual freedom or for political independence.
Western man's allegiance was moreover divided between
the City of God and the City of Man. After some 1,500 years of
stasis, the American Declaration of Independence resolved the
contradictions inherent in the ancien regime by pronouncing
the authority of law to be derived from the social contract as
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approved by the enlightened consent of the governed. The
authority of that consent was itself said to be derived from the
rights with which all men had been equally endowed by their
Creator under "the laws of nature and of nature's God." Thus
was forged the chain which linked the municipal authority of
legitimate human government with the divine government of
the universe while restoring moral autonomy to political life.
Professor Anastaplo quotes a professor of church history
who contrasts the "infallible and divine truth" taught by Jesus
with "the uncertain philosophical conclusions" of "limited and
finite minds," even minds such as those of Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle. But if we ask what Jesus's moral teaching was, we
will find nothing more fundamental than the golden rule, the
injunction found in Matthew 7:12 that "whatever you wish that
men would do to you, do so to them." Let us ask, however,
who is the "you" to whom this admonition is addressed? Is it
not all human beings everywhere? Does not Jesus presuppose
that with respect to their possession of rights, and their corre-
sponding obligation to respect the rights of others, "all men are
created equal"? In short, the doctrine of the Declaration is
already implied in the Judaeo-Christian ethic. In a sense, it is
the ground of that ethic. Certainly Lincoln had nothing less in
mind when he spoke of the great proposition as "an abstract
truth applicable to all men and all times." And this truth is
itself a truth no less of unassisted human reason than of divine
revelation.
As the epigraph of his Appendix A, Professor Anastaplo
has given us Deuteronomy 4: 5-6, a passage cited unforgettably
by Leo Strauss in his autobiographical preface to Spinoza's Cri-
tique of Religion. In it, Moses tells the children of Israel to
keep the statutes and judgments that the Lord God had com-
manded. For this, Moses says, "is your wisdom and your
understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear
these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and
understanding people." But surely, if Moses, and God, expected
the nations of the world to recognize the wisdom and under-
standing of Israel, then recognition of that wisdom and under-
standing must somehow be a human potentiality. As such, it
must belong to what we call human nature, whether or not we
believe that nature to be God's creation. If the recognition of
wisdom and understanding is possible in those to whom revela-
tion has not been vouchsafed, then that recognition is not itself
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caused by divine revelation. Let us recall Meno's dilemma:
how can one recognize something of which one is altogether
ignorant? St. Paul, in the Letter to the Romans, says that
"[w]hen the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature what
the law requires, they are a law to themselves. They show that
what the law requires is written on their hearts . . . ." From
this it would appear that the concept of "the laws of nature
and of nature's God," by which the good people of the colonies
justified their independence before all the nations, had ample
foundation in both the Old and New Testaments.
No one has expressed more powerfully than Leo Strauss
the apparent impossibility of deciding between Jerusalem and
Athens, between revelation and reason. "Yet," he has written,
"this very disagreement presupposes some agreement." In dis-
agreeing, they must at least agree on the importance of what
they are disagreeing about. "Negatively," says Strauss, "there
is perfect agreement between the Bible and Greek philosophy
in opposition to those elements of modernity" in which moral-
ity is deprecated as a merely human contrivance, having no
ground in either God or nature, and no obligation beyond
whatever utility it may be judged at any moment to have.
Moreover, says Strauss, "[o]ne can say, and it is not misleading
to say, that the Bible and Greek philosophy agree in regard to
what we may call, and we do call in fact, morality."
Let us repeat that, according to Leo Strauss, Jerusalem
and Athens are agreed negatively in their opposition to the
moral relativism, dissolving into nihilism, of modern philoso-
phy. They are also agreed affirmatively, for all practical pur-
poses, as to what that morality is that civil society ought to
protect and promote. There is no reason from Strauss's per-
spective, and no reason grounded in either modern philosophy
or modern science, why one should not understand that "the
city [whether ancient or modern] must be understood as being
for the sake of the practice of moral virtue." At any rate, I am
convinced that this is what the American Founding Fathers
understood when they expressed such sentiments as that in
the Northwest Ordinance that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowl-
edge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education, shall forever be
encouraged."
I am in agreement with Professor Anastaplo and Leo
Strauss that there is no final resolution that we can imagine
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between the ultimate differences of Jerusalem and Athens.
According to Strauss, however, the "unresolved conflict"
between the two "is the secret of the vitality of Western civili-
zation." Indeed, "the very life of Western civilization" is the
fundamental tension of these "two conflicting roots." How-
ever, the genius of the American Founding consists, above all,
in freely permitting this tension and this conflict to be the
transcendent end of political life, the end which the activity of
moral virtue ultimately serves. In this way, the very differ-
ences of Jerusalem and Athens become the highest ground of
harmony and peace.
There was never any intrinsic reason why the theoretical
conflict of Jerusalem and Athens, any more than the theoreti-
cal conflicts between philosophy and biblical religion, should
have racked Western civilization with sectarian political strug-
gle. Unresolved theoretical questions call only for continuing,
perhaps eternal, discussion. They ought not to make enemies
of those who, on moral grounds alone, are friends. On the con-
trary, such discussions, according to Aristotle, are the ground
of the highest form of friendship. In such discussions, unlike
those of politics which call for decision and action, truth alone
is the goal, and friendship itself requires that the friends do
not defer to each other's opinions for the sake of any good
extrinsic to the discussion itself. True theory ought, therefore,
always to strengthen friendship, and therewith morality and
good citizenship. Whatever undermines the moral consensus,
however, undermines the possibility of true theory, of genuine
philosophy and genuine religion.
B. The Ambiguity of Justice in Plato's Republic
Professor Anastaplo's discussion of the theme announced
in the foregoing title is acute. To address each of the difficul-
ties that he raises would require little less than a full commen-
tary on the Republic itself. The relevance of these difficulties
to the American Founding lies, however, in the following con-
sideration. The Republic, the dialogue on justice, cannot define
justice except by resort to myths or noble lies. The non-mythi-
cal truth about justice would seem to be as obscure at the end
of the dialogue as at the beginning. Yet the American Found-
ing boldly and confidently asserts that there are self-evident or
rational truths, which are the basis of the just powers
government.
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In taking up this difficulty, we turn to part of that lengthy
passage in Leo Strauss's The City and Man quoted by
Anastaplo:
One cannot help contrasting the Republic with the other dia-
logues which raise the question of what a given virtue is;
those other dialogues do not answer the question with which
they deal; they are aporetic dialogues. The Republic appears
to be a dialogue in which the truth is declared, a dogmatic
dialogue. But since the truth is set forth on the basis of
strikingly deficient evidence, one is compelled to say that the
Republic is in fact as aporetic as the so-called aporetic
dialogues.
A Socratic dialogue originates in the premise that we know
only that we know nothing. But knowledge of ignorance is not
essentially ignorance, it is essentially knowledge. We cannot
know that we do not know, without in some sense knowing
what we do not know. By inquiring into what we do not know
we learn more about our ignorance, and thereby we may make
progress in wisdom. In the Republic, we learn more and more
of the enigma that lies at the heart of the problem of justice.
As we learn more about this problem we become more just,
even without knowing it any final sense what justice is. Pro-
gress in wisdom always enlarges our awareness of our igno-
rance as our inquiries reveal more and more of what it is that
we do not know. The wisest man in the world, for example,
Socrates, is wisest precisely because he knows better than any-
one else what it is that he does not know. Starting from
Socratic premises, there is no real expectation that philosophy
or the love of wisdom will ever transform itself into wisdom
proper. As we learn from Plato's Apology of Socrates, eternal
felicity, as imagined by Socrates, is not the final contemplation
of the eternal truth, supposedly the activity of Aristotle's God,
but rather is eternal questioning of those presumed wise, to
unmask their unwisdom.
Philosophic activity, thus understood, however, is in ten-
sion with moral and political life. As Strauss puts it "The
theme of the Republic is political in more than one sense, and
the political questions of great urgency do not permit delay:
the question of justice must be answered by all means even if
the evidence needed for an adequate answer is not yet in. .. ."
To put the matter bluntly, we cannot wait until we have an
adequate answer to such questions as "what is courage?"
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before we train an army for war. Our enemy does not wait
upon the outcome of our seminars before attacking. The moti-
vation of a Platonic dialogue is not contingent upon its utility
for any political or nonphilosophic purpose. Just as for the
orthodox Jew, the reward for the fulfillment of the Torah's
commandment is the commandment, in a Socratic conversation
the reward for the dialogue is the dialogue. The aporia of the
dialogue, which reveals hitherto undisclosed knowledge of
ignorance, is its own end. Yet, there is a political purpose in
this self-contained human activity. It demonstrates that end-
in-itself which the city is intended to serve, that end, which
alone among human activities can make the city good and
thereby just.
It is also true, moreover, that each time Socrates exposes
the ignorance of someone else, he displays his superiority. The
accusation against Socrates, that he seeks victory, rather than
truth, has a certain plausibility. Socrates' dialectical victories
demonstrate what it is that can ultimately justify the sacrifices
that the city must ask of its citizens when it sends them into
battle. That Socrates' art is the perfectly political art is shown
by the fact that in the Gorgias, apparently contradicting what
he says in the Apology, Socrates declares that he alone among
the Athenians practices the art of the statesman. Although
Book I of the Republic is aporetic with respect to the definition
of justice, it is not aporetic with respect to the superiority of
Socrates to Thrasymachus. In proving himself "stronger" in
the decisive respect, Socrates establishes his right to rule on
Thrasymachus' own premises. Philosophy is stronger than
sophistry, and sophistry can become strong only by becoming
the handmaiden of philosophy. In the end, it is by sophistic
myths that Socrates confirms his rule, the rule of philosophy,
in the Republic taken as a whole. Still, it is clear that the phi-
losophers in the Republic are not ruled by the myths. For
them, as for Socrates, progress in wisdom, understood as pro-
gress in knowledge of ignorance, is sufficient to justify their
way of life. That way of life is objectively best, and the moral-
ity that serves it is the objectively true morality.
Let us conclude here by observing that the theme of the
Republic, the objective superiority of philosophy among all the
arts which direct human life, itself suffers none of the defects
that may be found in the definitions of justice. The ambiguity
to which Professor Anastaplo points does not undermine, but
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rather supports, this conclusion. The superiority of philosophy,
of purely theoretical activity having no end beyond itself, mir-
rors the self-contained activity of God in the universe, which
the polity can at best only imperfectly reflect.
The idea of "the laws of nature and of nature's God" is
derived from classical political philosophy. Like Socrates in
the Republic and in the Gorgias, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence identifies despotism as the quintessence of injustice
because of its violation of the laws of nature. It does not define
justice, but speaks rather of "the just powers of government."
Those powers, derived from the consent of the governed rest
upon the mutual recognition by the governed, of one another's
humanity. The consent of the governed must be enlightened,
because it clearly does not authorize a government either of
barbarians or savages. Barbarians and savages are those who
do not understand the essential meaning of what it is to be a
human being: that there is no such difference between man
and man as there is between man and beast, or between man
and god, that intrinsically justifies despotic government.
The government whose powers are just will not only be
non-arbitrary, a government of law, but will be a limited gov-
ernment: only a limited government can reconcile majority
rule with minority rights. But the ultimate reason that gov-
ernment should be limited is that human wisdom is limited.
Unassisted human reason cannot solve the problem of the
ambiguity of justice. Reason cannot rule upon the claims of
faith, nor faith upon the claims of unassisted reason. Only if
philosophy could be transformed into wisdom proper, the ulti-
mate aim of modern philosophy, particularly evident in the
contentions of Hegel and Marx, could the case be made that
government might be at once beneficent and despotic. This
was the contention of Kojeve, and the ground of his Stalinism,
vigorously refuted by Strauss, in their famous confrontation in
On Tyranny.
The essentially aporetic character of the Socratic dialogue
is supreme testimony to the proposition that philosophy cannot
be transformed into wisdom, and that moderation ought there-
fore to govern human affairs. Moderation thus conceived is
not moral indifference, rather it is the opposite of such indif-
ference. It is the virtue which lies at the heart of the rule of
law, and of that moderate constitutionalism which is taught by
the Declaration of Independence.
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C. Private Rights and Public Law: The Founders Perspective
Professor Anastaplo's third lecture is, as always, acute and
profound in its treatment of its topic. I think, however, that I
have already met the challenge it presents to my arguments.
The case for private rights in public law rests essentially upon
the case for limited government. Limited government presup-
poses the distinction between state and society, which is itself
derived from the distinction between church and state. These
are distinctions unknown to the ancient city, but indispensably
necessary to good government in the post-classical world, for
reasons we have amply given.
Above all, however, the rule of law and the concept of lim-
ited government, whether in the ancient city or in the modern
state, depend equally upon the Socratic insight which tran-
scends the distinction of ancient and modern politics. This is
the insight into the limits of human wisdom. Every Socratic
dialogue, and especially the Republic, is a lesson in the limits
of human wisdom, and therewith a lesson in the need for mod-
eration. Intrinsic to that moderation, as an element of what we
call western civilization, is the recognition of the possibility
that divine revelation may cast light where Socratic inquiry
can uncover only knowledge of ignorance. But the light of
divine revelation can be truly enlightening, rather than blind-
ing, only when it enters the soul without the adventitious
intervention of worldly rewards or punishments. The Ameri-
can doctrine of separation of church and state, Jefferson's doc-
trine of religious liberty, is therefore at the very heart of all
private rights, of all minority rights beyond the control and of
the majority.
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